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Active consumers who engage in energy consumption, production, storage and provide
ancillary services in a dynamic and interactive manner will be an integral part of the future
grid. Firstly, this dissertation models and analyzes the interaction between active consumers
and aggregators with a specific focus on consumer actions in response to real-time electricity
pricing and the resulting impact on grid voltage. A unique prospect theory based consumer
behavior model is introduced. This model captures wide range of consumers each with
their individual preferences by modeling the interaction between the active consumers and
the aggregator as a Stackelberg game. However, unlike existing game theoretic efforts that
assume rational behavior of consumers, the prospect theory based models systematically
incorporate realistic consumer behavior including irrationality.
Secondly, this dissertation develops probabilistic voltage sensitivity analysis. In contrast
to prior approaches that limit themselves to economic aspects, the proposed techno-economic
perspective provides an understanding of the impact of large scale penetration of active
consumers on the physical grid. Most current studies are scenario-based, and derived results
are scenario specific. Determining the impact of spatially distributed active consumers with
temporally variable behavior requires investigation of a large number of scenarios, which
is computationally intractable using current iterative power flow algorithms. This work
provides a new analytical method of voltage sensitivity analysis that allows for stochastic
analysis of change in grid voltage due to change in consumer behavior (load and generation
choices). This work first derives an upper bound for change in voltage at a particular bus
due to change in power consumption at other buses in a radial distribution network. Next,
this bound is used to derive the probability distribution of change voltage at a bus due to
randomly changing power consumption/injection of random spatial distribution of the active
consumers. This upper bound is also used to develop an algorithmic approach to identify
the dominant influencer of voltage fluctuations in the power distribution system.
Thirdly, security and stability aspects of transactive energy market based power distribu-
tion system is investigated. Specifically, the impact of attacks on pricing/load signals on the
physical grid is quantified. This work models the interaction between real-time electricity
price and total energy demand in the form of a discrete time non-linear autonomous dynam-
ical system. Equilibrium electricity price and energy demand associated with this coupled
dynamical system is derived and conditions for bounded input bounded output (BIBO) sta-
bility are identified. Then, a BIBO stable algorithm to design real-time electricity pricing
scheme from a techno-economic perspective is developed. Finally, the impact of various level
of false data injection (FDI) attack on price of electricity, demand and distribution system
voltage is investigated. This dissertation shows that impact of FDI attack on electricity
prices is more severe than an attack on electricity demand.
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Abstract
Active consumers who engage in energy consumption, production, storage and provide
ancillary services in a dynamic and interactive manner will be an integral part of the future
grid. Firstly, this dissertation models and analyzes the interaction between active consumers
and aggregators with a specific focus on consumer actions in response to real-time electricity
pricing and the resulting impact on grid voltage. A unique prospect theory based consumer
behavior model is introduced. This model captures wide range of consumers each with
their individual preferences by modeling the interaction between the active consumers and
the aggregator as a Stackelberg game. However, unlike existing game theoretic efforts that
assume rational behavior of consumers, the prospect theory based models systematically
incorporate realistic consumer behavior including irrationality.
Secondly, this dissertation develops probabilistic voltage sensitivity analysis. In contrast
to prior approaches that limit themselves to economic aspects, the proposed techno-economic
perspective provides an understanding of the impact of large scale penetration of active
consumers on the physical grid. Most current studies are scenario-based, and derived results
are scenario specific. Determining the impact of spatially distributed active consumers with
temporally variable behavior requires investigation of a large number of scenarios, which
is computationally intractable using current iterative power flow algorithms. This work
provides a new analytical method of voltage sensitivity analysis that allows for stochastic
analysis of change in grid voltage due to change in consumer behavior (load and generation
choices). This work first derives an upper bound for change in voltage at a particular bus
due to change in power consumption at other buses in a radial distribution network. Next,
this bound is used to derive the probability distribution of change voltage at a bus due to
randomly changing power consumption/injection of random spatial distribution of the active
consumers. This upper bound is also used to develop an algorithmic approach to identify
the dominant influencer of voltage fluctuations in the power distribution system.
Thirdly, security and stability aspects of transactive energy market based power distribu-
tion system is investigated. Specifically, the impact of attacks on pricing/load signals on the
physical grid is quantified. This work models the interaction between real-time electricity
price and total energy demand in the form of a discrete time non-linear autonomous dynam-
ical system. Equilibrium electricity price and energy demand associated with this coupled
dynamical system is derived and conditions for bounded input bounded output (BIBO) sta-
bility are identified. Then, a BIBO stable algorithm to design real-time electricity pricing
scheme from a techno-economic perspective is developed. Finally, the impact of various level
of false data injection (FDI) attack on price of electricity, demand and distribution system
voltage is investigated. This dissertation shows that impact of FDI attack on electricity
prices is more severe than an attack on electricity demand.
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The power and energy field has changed significantly over the last decade. Specifically,
renewable generation has increased multi-fold, new technologies for smart grid are being
implemented, and electric vehicles are gaining popularity. A smart power grid leverages
advances in sensing, communication, computing, and control to increase grid reliability,
resiliency, efficiency, and flexibility [1]. Integration of these technologies also allows higher
deployment of large and small-scale renewable energy resources. With incorporation of
renewable generation and “active consumers”, there will be continuing need for improvements
in the grid analysis, operation and planning tools in addition to changes in the operation
of electricity market in power distribution system. The most significant impact of these
changes is being felt at the consumer level. Understanding consumer behavior and developing
useful models will be one of the primary challenges in future smart grid. New generation of
appliances within the home are becoming smarter with load management and communication
capabilities. As a result of these advances, future consumers will be very different from those
today. It is expected that active consumers who engage in managing energy use, production,
storage and providing other ancillary services in a dynamic and interactive manner will be an
integral part of the future grid. There will be a continuing need to integrate cyber-physical
system (CPS) advances into the operation, control, and design of these systems. Therefore,
understanding, modeling and quantifying the impact of the active consumers under the
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umbrella of cyber physical social and economic systems is an important and much needed
research thrust.
Historically, residential consumers have paid a fixed price for electricity regardless of the
time at which the consumption takes place. Some utilities have implemented time-of-use
and critical peak pricing on a limited basis [2, 3, 4, 5]. Real-time pricing of electricity for
the residential consumers has been tested for demand response, but wide scale implementa-
tion will require overcoming various technical and logistical challenges [6, 7] However, with
advances in communications and cyber technologies, these challenges can be addressed and
real-time pricing for consumers can become a reality. Hence, the biggest change the con-
sumers will see in the future is more engagement and ability to actively participate in the
Transactive Energy market [8, 9] Transactive Energy as defined by GridWise Alliance in a
December 2014 report is “The ability for consumers and end devices to buy and sell energy
and related services in a dynamic and interactive manner.” For an individual customer, it
will be impossible to keep track of various decisions that will be required in real-time as well
in the immediate future in a highly dynamic transactive energy market. Therefore, each
home is expected to be equipped with a home energy management system [10, 11, 12, 13, 14]
or a complex computer, which will use real-time price, real-time data on loads, generation,
energy storage, weather, and customer preferences to schedule different devices in homes.
Second major challenge is to understand the impact of multiple active consumer and re-
newable energy sources on the power distribution system. At the utility level, new dynamics
may emerge due to participation of new active customers in the market place that could
create conditions detrimental to reliability and resiliency of the power distribution system.
Analyzing impact of multiple active consumers changing their energy consumption in accor-
dance with renewable generational and forces of transactive energy market on distribution
grid voltage in a computationally efficient manner is a crucial aspect of this dissertation.
Currently, Monte-Carlo simulation based scenario analysis is primary tool to understand im-
pact of random fluctuations of renewable generation on the distribution grid voltage. Major
drawbacks of theses scenario based analysis are higher computational complexity and lack
of analytical insight. Higher computationally complexity of such scenario based analysis is a
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major hurdle in implementation of true techno-economic analysis of the distribution system
and makes it simulation of a transactive energy system challenging. For example, one might
be interested in understanding impact of X% penetration of rooftop PVs in a distribution
system with N consumers or identifying most dominant influencer of voltage fluctuations for
a node experiencing low voltage problems in the power distribution system. In this example,
to answer question like “For given PV penetration is it possible to maintain the distribu-
tion system voltage within permissible limits without any control actions?” using traditional
scenario based analysis, one will have to follow two steps.
1. Create a system model with fixed location of PVs and run Newton-Raphson based
Monte-Carlo simulation to capture temporal variation on PV generation.
2. Repeat step-1 for all possible spatial distribution of PV generation.
Computational complexity of such scenario based analysis increases exponentially with the
size of the network.
Finally, analyzing impact of cyber attack on reliability and stability of power distribution
system is crucial. Future power distribution system with smart meters and advanced me-
tering infrastructure (AMI) will have bidirectional communication between active consumer
and aggregators. In the transactive energy framework, the price of electricity for the active
consumers decided by the aggregator and the energy consumption of the active consumers is
communicated over AMI. This information exchange between the aggregator and the active
consumers is prone of cyber attack. There is plethora of work done to design strategies to
prevent and detect such cyber attacks; however, no attack detection/prevention mechanism
is perfect. Therefore, it is crucial to understand impact of cyber attacks in presence of such
detection and prevention mechanism.
Based on these perspectives, we seek to address a few fundamental research questions in
this dissertation. These questions and the contributions of this dissertation to address them
are discussed in the following sections.
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Figure 1.1: Outline of the Dissertation
1.1 Research Questions
Question 1: How can we model different consumer types, capturing their preferences and
reactions to changes in electricity price? What modeling approaches can support power dis-
tribution systems (PDS) operation and can also aid in representing consumers in other CPS
domains?
Question 2: For a given penetration of active consumers, how can we approximate the im-
pact of their actions on the distribution system voltage in a computationally efficient manner?
Question 3: How can we calculate impact of random power change caused by multiple re-
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newable energy sources located at random spatial locations in the power distribution system?
Question 4: In the power distribution system where actions of multiple active consumers
cause random voltage fluctuations, how can we identify the dominant influencer of voltage
fluctuations?
Question 5: What are the cyber-security concerns in a power distribution system with ac-
tive consumers interacting with aggregators? For example, what is the impact of false data
injection attack on this system? What are some design guidelines for this transactive energy
market based power distribution system that ensures stability of a real-time pricing scheme?
1.2 Contributions of the Dissertation
To address research question 1, Chapter 3 of this dissertation proposes a Prospect Theory
based model of active consumers making subjective actions under uncertain price of elec-
tricity and analyzes the impact of their actions on the distribution grid voltage. Major
contributions of this chapter are listed below.
• This work models interaction between an aggregator and multiple active consumers
connected to a power distribution system as a Stackelberg leader-follower game, where
the aggregator acts as a leader and the active consumers are followers.
• A general model that efficiently captures consumers with varying preferences for elec-
tricity consumption is considered. For the first time, the subjective behavior of con-
sumers in response to variations in the price of electricity is modeled using the Prospect
Theory.
• Behavior of the aggregator is modeled by considering both technical and economic
aspects of grid operation. The economic goal of maximizing profit is integrated with
the technical goal of maintaining the grid voltage within permissible limits in the game
formulation.
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• Actions of active consumers at the Nash equilibrium and its impact on the distribution
grid voltage is analyzed using simulations on the modified IEEE 69 bus test system.
• The difference between expected utility theory to the Prospect Theory formulations are
highlighted. Specifically the impact of lack of rationality on the physical grid voltage
and monetary payoffs for both the consumer and the aggregator is quantified.
More details related to this approach is in Chapter 3 and published in the following article:
[15]: K. Jhala, B. Natarajan, and A. Pahwa,“Prospect Theory based Active Consumer
Behavior Under Variable Electricity Pricing,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2018. doi:
10.1109/TSG.2018.2810819.
A new probabilistic voltage sensitivity analysis (PVSA) approach is proposed to address
research questions 2 and 3. Chapter 4 and 5 of this dissertation proposes a stochastic method
of grid analysis that provides a probabilistic view of the system and presents the likelihood
of system voltage exceeding operational bounds. Major contributions of this work are listed
below.
• This work develops an analytical expression (Theorem 1) to compute the upper bound
of change in bus voltage due to change in power consumption at another bus in a radial
distribution network. The derived analytical expression is proven to abide by the law
of superposition, which enables us to study the effect of multiple active consumers
on distribution grid voltage. This upper-bound is verified using simulation results on
IEEE 69 bus test system. (chapter 4)
• A method to compute an upper bound on sensitivity matrix is demonstrated. The
proposed approach is computationally efficient.
• This work introduces a novel concept of probabilistic voltage sensitivity analysis (PVSA).
PVSA allows the calculation of probability distribution of voltage change due to ran-
dom change in real and reactive power consumption across different buses of distribu-
tion grid.
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• PVSA for known/fixed and random spatial distribution of active consumers is devel-
oped in chapter 5.
• The proposed method is used to the analyze the aggregate effect of spatially distributed
active consumers on feeder voltage and determine that the probability of bus voltage
exceeding allowable values. Analytical results are validated using simulation results on
IEEE 69 bus test system.
More details on probabilistic voltage sensitivity analysis can be found in Chapters 4 and 5
and in the following articles:
[16]: K. Jhala, B. Natarajan and A. Pahwa, “Probabilistic Voltage Sensitivity Analysis
(PVSA)A Novel Approach to Quantify Impact of Active Consumers,” in IEEE Transac-
tions on Power Systems, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 2518-2527, May 2018. doi: 10.1109/TP-
WRS.2017.2745411
[17]: K. Jhala, B. Natarajan and A. Pahwa, “Probabilistic Voltage Sensitivity Analysis
(PVSA) for Random Spatial Distribution of Active Consumers,” in 2018 IEEE Power En-
ergy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT), Feb 2018, pp. 1-5.
To address research question 4, chapter 6 of this dissertation introduces an analytical
method to identify the dominant influencer of the voltage fluctuations using various infor-
mation theoretic metrics.
• This work introduces the concept of the dominant influencer of the voltage fluctua-
tions in a radial power distribution system. The dominant influencer of the voltage
fluctuations at is the largest contributor of source of voltage change at the observation
node.
• A Monte-Carlo simulation based numerical method to identify the dominant influ-
encer of the voltage fluctuations is proposed, which is shown to be computationally
cumbersome.
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• Various information theoretic indicators to identify the dominant influencer of the
voltage fluctuations are proposed.
• All the proposed indicators of the dominant influencer of the voltage fluctuations are
analytically derived and their effectiveness is tested using the IEEE 69 bus balanced
test system.
• It is shown that differential entropy, Kullback-Leibler distance, and Frechet distance
are excellent and computationally efficient indicators of the dominant influencer of the
voltage fluctuations.
More detail of this work are discussed in chapter 6 and under review in the following article:
[18]: K. Jhala, B. Natarajan, and A. Pahwa,“Algorithmic Approach to Identify Dominant
Influencer of Voltage Fluctuations,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid (Under Review),
2018.
Finally, a novel control theoretic perspective is used to address search question 5. Chapter
7 of this dissertation discusses the impact of cyber attacks on stability and security of
transactive energy based power distribution system.
• This work models interaction between real-time electricity pricing and demand as a
discrete time non-linear autonomous dynamical system, where the aggregator decides
electricity price based on total demand and multiple active consumers decide their
consumption based on electricity prices. Based on this coupled dynamical system
model, equilibrium electricity price and demand is derived (Theorem 5 and 6) and
conditions for BIBO stability of the proposed system model are identified (Lemma 2
and 3)
• This work develops an algorithm to design a BIBO stable TE market based real-time
electricity price scheme that considers financial interests of the aggregator in addition
to system resiliency.
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• The impact of FDI attack on price of electricity and demand is quantified. This paper
shows that impact of FDI attack on electricity prices is more severe than an attack on
electricity demand. The impact of FDI attack on real-time electricity prices, demand
and distribution system voltage is illustrated using simulation of an IEEE 69 bus test
system.
More details on this approach can be found in the following article:
[19]: K. Jhala, B. Natarajan, A. Pahwa, and H. Wu, “Security and Stability of Transac-
tive Energy Marked-based Power Distribution System,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
(Under Review), 2018.
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation
Rest of this dissertation is organized as following. Chapter 2, discuses related work in the
area of demand response, consumer modeling, traditional methods of sensitivity analysis
and cyber security of power distribution system. A prospect theory based model of irra-
tional active consumers is developed in chapter 3, which captures the behavior of the active
consumers with different socio-economic background and varying preferences for electricity
consumption. Chapter 4 develops an analytical method of voltage sensitivity analysis, which
is computationally efficient. Chapter 5 develops probabilistic voltage sensitivity analysis for
known and random spatial distribution of active consumers to analyze impact of multiple
active consumers on distribution grid voltage. Chapter 6 develops an algorithmic approach
to identify dominant influencer of voltage fluctuation. Chapter 7 analyzes stability and se-
curity of transactive energy market based power distribution system and develops criteria
for designing a bounded input bounded output (BIBO) stable real-time electricity pricing




This chapter discusses the related work in area of Demand response(DR), distributed gen-
eration(DG) management, consumer modeling, voltage sensitivity analysis, and security of
power distribution system.
2.1 Related Work on Demand Response
Over the past decade, there have been numerous efforts that have attempted to model,
manage and optimize participation of consumers in the power distribution system. These
efforts can be broadly classified into two classes: (1) demand response (DR) programs fo-
cusing only on load management; (2) demand response and distributed generation (DG)
management. The first dimension of the work relates to residential demand response, which
typically leverages price and generation forecasts to either shift or reduce load consumption
in order to maximize some utility function (e.g., energy costs [20]) under some constraints
(levels of comfort/convenience [21]). One approach is to implement direct load control where
a utility or an aggregator can remotely control certain loads in a household based on an a
priori agreement [22]. User privacy is the primary barrier for large scale implementation
of such direct load control methods. Alternately, smart pricing (e.g., critical peak pricing
(CPP), TOU pricing and real time pricing (RTP)) can be used to encourage consumers to
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individually manage their loads [2]. A plethora of deterministic centralized and distributed
optimization [23], model predictive control [24], reinforcement learning [25] as well as game
theoretic methods [26] have been proposed to attack these problems. Recently, there have
been some efforts to systematically model uncertainties in this framework and implement
stochastic versions of optimization [27], and dynamic programming [28] methods.
2.2 Related Work on Consumer Modeling
There is a plethora of research in the area of smart buildings energy management systems.
Authors in [29] define a building management system that controls energy flow inside a
smart building with renewable energy sources and energy storage using a heuristic optimiza-
tion process. [30] reviews some of the technical opportunities provided by internet of things
in smart building management area. Authors in [31] build a building energy management
system including a grid-connected PV system and a storage system using the mixed-integer
linear programming framework for the purpose of optimizing scheduling of building elements
in order to achieve a pre-specified objective. In [32], an intelligent residential energy man-
agement system to reduce electricity bills for prosumers of smart residential buildings is
proposed, and its benefits are demonstrated through a case study.
Many of the prior efforts in the area of DR and DG management tend to take a user/home
centric approach. That is, the goal is to minimize energy costs for a home owner by scheduling
and reducing load and managing generation and storage [33, 34, 35, 36]. While this is an
essential step in understanding optimal actions for a consumer, it is important to note that
the consumer is not acting in isolation and the operational cost and stability of the grid is
dependent on the cumulative actions of multiple consumers. This aspect was brought out
in [26], where a demand side management scheme based on collaborative game theoretic
approach is proposed. The efforts within the control theory community that focuses on
modeling consumer behavior also rely on deterministic frameworks [37]. A data driven
approach to model consumers demand response behavior was presented in [38], where authors
hypothesize a long term steady behavior and short term dynamic response behavior. Since,
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the analysis was data based, the generality of this model is unclear. There have been many
game theoretic efforts to address some of the challenges in smart grid. All these efforts use
classical EUT assuming rational behavior of players [39, 40], which is not pragmatic. There
are few efforts that use the Prospect Theory to address some of the challenges in power
systems. Most of these efforts are limited to investigating the energy interactions between
micro-grids [41, 42].
2.3 Related Work on Voltage Sensitivity Analysis
There have been numerous efforts to solve issue of voltage control in distribution system
with distributed generation (DG) using sensitivity analysis based methods. These efforts
mainly use traditional methods of sensitivity analysis to address the issue of voltage control
[43, 44, 45, 46, 47]. Traditional methods of sensitivity analysis and drawbacks of such
methods are discussed in section 4.1. These traditional methods of sensitivity analysis do not
provide analytical insight into the underlying physics of the system and are computationally
complex. There is a limit body of work focused on developing analytical approximation of
voltage sensitivity [48, 49, 50, 51]. Unfortunately, most of these efforts are over simplistic and
their accuracy is not verified through numerical simulation of test systems. The problem
of voltage regulation in smart grid using reactive power control using sensitivity analysis
based approach is addressed in [48]. Similarly, authors in [49, 50, 51] proposes a sensitivity
analysis based algorithm to keep voltage within permitted limits by modifying active and
reactive power of DGs. A direct sensitivity analysis method is proposed in these papers
that gives voltage variation at given bus with respect to voltage at slack bus. However,
this method assumes voltage angle to be negligible and does not consider complex value of
voltage change. These papers do not provide any simulation result to verify the validity of
method. Therefore, an analytical framework for understanding and quantify the effect of
random active and reactive power perturbation on bus voltages is needed. Authors in [52]
present a probabilistic method that uses sensitivity analysis and smart meter measurements
for setting boundary values for distribution system operation indices. [52] assumes that
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real and reactive power consumption of homes is independent, which is not the case usually.
Secondarily, one of the key drawbacks of this work lies in its dependance on extensive Monte-
carlo (MC) simulation and data from smart meters to quantify the distribution of voltage
variation. This approach is not scalable for large distribution networks. Our proposed
analytical approximation aid in performing voltage sensitivity analysis in a scalable, low
complexity means.
2.4 Related Work on Security and Stability
There are some efforts to investigate impact of cyber attack on smart grid. The possible
impacts of the FDI attack on power system have been reported in [53, 54]. A coordinated
attack by forcing system to an insecure or uneconomic state of operation can further lead to a
collapse if not detected in time as presented in [55]. Many methods have been reported in the
literature to alleviate FDI attacks in the smart grid. The defense techniques can be broadly
classified into two categories: (1) Protection-based defense, and (2) Detection-based de-
fense. As power grid covers a vast geographical area with hundreds and thousands of smart
meters/sensors, the cost of protecting all smart meters can be very high. A lightweight
watermarking technique is proposed to defend against the FDI attacks [56]. Authors in
[57] presented a strategy for detection of FDI attacks by reconfiguring the micro-grids dy-
namically and makes it impossible to organize a synchronized injection. [58] consider the
distributed load sharing problem of the microgrids operating in autonomous mode under
FDI. The impact of real time pricing attacks on the demand dynamics is quantified in [59].
[60] propose joint-transformation-based scheme to detect FDI attacks in real time using
Kullback-Leibler distance to find the difference between probability distributions obtained
from measurement variations. The smart meters can be protected by continuously monitor-
ing the measured data or by encrypting the measured data. Shortcomings of the protection
based defense are twofold; firstly, securing the critical set of measurements leads to decrease
in redundant trustworthy measurements; secondly, the assumption of making a completely
hack-proof smart sensor is unrealistic. Therefore, understanding dynamics and stability of
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electricity price and demand in addition to impact of a successful FDI attack in the TE
based distribution system is critical to answer questions like “What is the level of attack




Prospect Theory based Active
Consumer Behavior Under Variable
Electricity Pricing
Future power distribution with distributed renewable generation, electric vehicles and im-
plementation of new smart grid technologies will be very different from today. The most
significant impact of these changes is being felt at the consumer level. The biggest change
the consumers will see in the future is more engagement and ability to actively participate in
the Transactive Energy Market (TEM) [9]. As envisioned, large commercial, industrial cus-
tomers, and individual homeowners will be able to participate directly in markets set up by
the utility or by third party aggregators. For an individual customer, it will be impossible to
keep track of various decisions that will be required in real-time as well as in the immediate
future in a highly dynamic transactive energy market. Therefore, each home is expected to
be equipped with a home energy management system [10, 12, 13, 14] or a complex computer,
which will use real-time electricity price, real-time data on loads/generation, and customer
preferences to schedule different devices in homes. These efforts primarily focus on cost
saving for the consumer as discussed thoroughly in the next subsection. However, it is im-
portant to note that at the utility level, new dynamics may emerge due to participation of
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new active customers in the market place that could create conditions detrimental to reli-
ability and resiliency of the system. Utilities will have to implement appropriate controls
to keep the system stable and within bounds. High penetration of solar PV can also cause
technical issues as recently reported for Hawaii [61], where the utilities are refusing inter-
connection of additional rooftop PV systems due to operating issues. To address some of
these challenges it is important to integrate physical grid constraints and economic aspects
resulting in techno-economic analysis of the underlying grid.
With the anticipated growth in active consumers, modeling consumer behavior to chang-
ing price of electricity is a crucial aspect of this work. Although the most common reaction
for any consumer is to take actions which will save money, there are consumers who give
more importance to other factors such as environment and comfort. Frugal consumers are
typically more concerned about saving money at the cost of comfort and environment. Green
consumers give higher importance to the environment relative to money and comfort. On the
other hand, comfort maybe the most important aspect for affluent consumers. Additionally,
there may be consumers who do not care and thus they will not make any adjustments to
their power usage pattern based on pricing. Many prior efforts attempt to model consumer
actions in response to pricing within the framework of game theory.
Traditional game theory assumes that players in the game are rational and uninfluenced
by real-life perceptions. Most of game theoretic work in smart grid are based on assumption
that consumers make decisions according to their expected utility. However, real-life decision
making of consumers is influenced by their perceived subjectivity which cannot be explained
by expected utility theory (EUT). A Nobel Prize winning theory, Prospect Theory [62]
explains the fact that people usually over-weigh low probability bad outcomes and under-
weigh high probability favorite outcomes. This work uses the Prospect Theory to capture
subjective behavior of active consumers for uncertain price of electricity. A unique aspect
of this work is the modeling of a wide range of consumers and their behavior/response to
pricing using the Prospect Theory.
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Figure 3.1: System Model
3.1 System Model
The future power distribution systems will involve multiple active consumers interacting
with a third party aggregator as shown in Fig. 3.1. This work considers a scenario where
multiple active consumers that are part of the power distribution network have a contractual
agreement with a third party aggregator. The aggregator buys electricity in a day-ahead
wholesale market from the independent system operator (ISO) and sells it to consumers. Any
additional energy required is purchased in the real-time market. Based on the day-ahead
agreement that the aggregator makes with ISO, the aggregator decides the electricity pricing
to influence electricity consumption of active consumers. In addition to all financial trans-
actions, the aggregator is also responsible for maintaining the grid voltage within allowable
limits. In case of a voltage violation, the aggregator pays a penalty to the electric utility
company that owns the physical grid infrastructure. Therefore, the aggregator decides the
price of electricity that maximizes the profit while keeping voltages of distribution system
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within limits.
In a Transactive Energy Market, each active consumer can interact with the grid by
changing its energy consumption or by providing real power support from the local renewable
generation. In essence, each consumer chooses an action ai, which is power drawn from the
grid or power supplied back to the grid. The consumer’s choice of action ai is based on
its perceived payoff that is determined by the price of electricity. It should be noted that
the payoff could depend on more than a single metric. For example, the payoff for an
active consumer could depend on (1) cost of electricity; (2) comfort achieved by consuming
energy, and (3) impact of their action on the distribution grid voltage. Aggregation of
payoff metrics in the payoff vector to decide the optimal action would depend on the class to
which the consumer belongs. Goal of a comfort seeking consumer is to maximize the comfort
achieved by consuming energy. Some consumers may want to minimize the cost of electricity
consumption. Active consumers who consider the physical grid voltage while making their
decision want to keep the distribution grid voltage at the node of connection close to the
rated value. While at this point of time, a grid-conscious consumers may seem utopian, it
is interesting to model and consider the impact of such customers. One may expect such
consumer types in community owned microgrids where the social aspect of maintaining grid
constraints play an important role. In this work, it is assumed that a consumer connected to
node i of the distribution system knows ith diagonal element of the sensitivity matrix, which
is used to compute change in voltage at node i due to change in action of ith consumer.
Additionally, electricity prices would be communicated to consumers by the aggregator over
the cyber infrastructure. Price of electricity, which is decided by the aggregator, can take
values from a set ρ, where ρ = {ρ1, ρ2, · · · , ρn}. However exact price of electricity is unknown
to consumers. The aggregator decides the probability distribution of electricity prices. Let
P be vector of probabilities given by:
P = [P(ρ = ρ1),P(ρ = ρ2), · · · ,P(ρ = ρn)]T . (3.1)
Active consumers decide their energy consumption based on their perceived probability dis-
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Figure 3.2: Probability weighting function ω(p)
tribution of electricity prices. The Prospect Theory is used to understand decision making
of a subjective consumer under uncertainty.
3.2 Background: Expected Utility Theory vs Prospect
Theory
Traditional game theory assumes that players behave rationally while making decisions under
risk. Most game theoretic studies in the field of power system assume that player makes
decisions according to their expected utility. However, it is well known that people do
not behave rationally under uncertainty and their decisions are influenced by their real-life
perception. Traditional Expected Utility Theory (EUT) cannot explain deviations in player’s
actions due to end user subjectivity as illustrated by Allaiss paradox [62].
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The Prospect Theory (PT) provides a user-centric view to address this issue by applying
probability weighting effect to transform objective probabilities of players into subjective
probabilities [62, 63]. The Nobel Prize winning theory explains the fact that people usu-
ally over-weigh low probability outcomes and under-weigh outcomes with moderate to high
probabilities, which the EUT fails to explain [62]. According to the PT, people use their
subjective probabilities (ω(p)) rather than objective probabilities (p) to weight the values of
possible outcomes. This phenomenon is observed in many social science studies. Authors
in [63] propose an original form of probability weighting function based on experiments.
Although, there have been numerous efforts to mathematically model the subjectivity in hu-
man behavior, most of these models are mathematically complex, which makes them difficult
to use in real-life. Authors in [64] developed a new version of the Prospect Theory using cu-
mulative representation of uncertainty that captures risk aversion for gains and risk seeking
behavior for losses of high probability with in a low complexity analytical form. Therefore,
in this work the one proposed by Prelec in [64] is used and corresponds to
ω(p) = exp(−(− log p)α), 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (3.2)
where p is the objective probability and ω(p) is the subjective probability. Here α is the
coefficient of rationality that reveals how a person’s subjective evaluation distorts the ob-
jective probabilities (P). Active consumers who are more rational have higher value for
coefficient of rationality (α), whereas customers that are more subjective have lower α. Fig.
3.2 shows probability weighting function for α = 0.5 and α = 1.0, where α = 1 implies
that player is completely rational and behaves according to the EUT. Using the Prospect
Theory, this work develops a model of a general active consumer that may not behave ra-
tionally and makes subjective decisions. In the proposed system model, the home energy
management system makes real-time decisions on behalf of active consumers. Such devices
must be programmed according to consumer’s preferences. Different consumers can have
different preferences for energy consumption and their preference can be possibly irrational,
especially in the presence of uncertainty. For example, some consumers may be more risk
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taking while some may be more risk averse and this variability is captured in the Prospect
Theory based model. In either case, consumer preferences and their inherent irrationality
can be programmed into such smart home energy management system. Since devices merely
reflect consumer choices, they will not override any irrational choice made by a risk aware
consumer even if it contradicts an objective option. Interaction between the consumers and
the aggregator is modeled as a Stackelberg leader-follower game as discussed next.
3.2.1 Background: Stackelberg Leader-Follower Game
In game theory, Stackelberg leadership model is a strategic game in which the leader moves
first and then the followers move sequentially. In the power distribution system model
this corresponds to the following: the aggregator plays a mixed strategy first. The active
consumers observe mixed strategy of the aggregator and decide energy consumption that
maximizes their payoff function. Existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium is dependent
on the following assumptions: (1) the leader chooses the optimal strategy first and it is
irreversible, (2) the leader knows ex ante that the followers observe the strategy, and (3) the
followers have no means of committing to a non-Stackelberg follower action and the leader
knows this. In this scenario, it is assumed that the aggregator will play the optimal mixed
strategy estimating the best response action of the active consumers. The active consumers
will observe the mixed strategy played by the aggregator and play their best response action
under uncertain price of electricity. In this Stackelberg leader-follower game between the
consumers and the aggregator, the aggregator act as a leader that plays mixed strategy by
deciding probability distribution for electricity prices and the consumers are followers that
play pure strategy by deciding the power drawn or injected into the grid.
The proposed Prospect Theory based framework is general enough to be used for real-
time or day-ahead applications. The proposed game theoretic framework models behavior of
irrational active consumer for only one time instant, which can be used to model elasticity of
loads. However, it does not capture time dependent model of an active consumer’s behavior.
A time dependent model of active consumer behavior along with correlated load scheduling
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will be pursued as part of the future work which will capture shift in demands due to price
of electricity.
3.3 Active Consumer Modeling
Modeling different consumer types, capturing their preferences and reactions to changes in
electricity price and renewable generation is challenging. Consumers may belong to different
socioeconomic classes with different value or preference for electricity consumption. In the
Transactive Energy Market, the active consumers decide their energy consumption based on
price of electricity that they receive from the aggregator. Actions of consumers are based
on their perceived payoff. The payoff function could be composed of more than a single
objective. For example, in this work, the payoff function of an active consumer incorporates
three metrics corresponding to economics, comfort and environmental costs. The payoff
function for ith active consumer can be written as:
ui(ai, ρ) = βi log(ai +Ri + 1)− ρai − γi(v(i) + S(i, i)(âi − ai)− 1)2 (3.3)
where, ai is action of ith active consumer that represents energy purchased from the grid or
sold to the grid. Ri is the amount of renewable generation available to the i
th consumer, which
is known to the aggregator, and βi is the comfort coefficient to represent comfort seeking
level of a particular active consumer. Each active consumer gains some utility for consuming
electricity as per the energy gain function, which can be written as βi log(ai + Ri + 1) [65].
The energy gain function of a consumer is an increasing function of ai with diminishing
returns. For instance, an active consumer consuming less energy benefits much more from
receiving additional unit of energy than the active consumer consuming higher energy. ρ is
the price of electricity that a consumer pays to the aggregator. The active consumer have
to pay ρai amount of money to the aggregator. v(i) is the distribution grid voltage at node
i, and âi indicates previous action of the i
th active consumer when voltage at node i of the
distribution grid was v(i). S(i, i) is ith diagonal element of the voltage sensitivity matrix, and
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γi is coefficient of grid awareness that indicates level of the i
th consumer’s concerns for the grid
voltage while taking action. Positive values of ai indicates that the active consumer is buying
energy from the grid and negative values of ai indicate that the active consumer is selling
energy back to the grid. ai > −Ri, which implies that the active consumer cannot sell more
energy than produced by the renewable generation. Different consumers may give different
weightage to different metrics. Aggregation of these metrics into a single payoff function to
decide the optimal action would depend on the class to which the active consumer belongs.
For example, a highly comfort seeking consumer may have higher values of βi compared to
a low comfort seeking consumer.
This work assumes that consumers can measure the distribution grid voltage at their
node of connection. However, information about voltage at nodes other than node i is not
available to an active consumer not connected at node i of the distribution grid. An active
consumer connected to the ith node in the distribution system is also assumed to know ith
diagonal element of the sensitivity matrix, which can be used to compute change in voltage
at node i due to change in power at node i. An analytical method to compute sensitivity
matrix is proposed in [16, 17], using which an active consumer can compute ith diagonal
element of the sensitivity matrix (S(i, i)). Goal of grid aware active consumers is to keep the
voltage at point of connection close to the rated value by adjusting electricity consumption
by minimizing γi(v(i) + S(i, i)(âi − ai)− 1)2.
In this work, type of consumers are differentiated based on their comfort requirement,
price responsiveness and awareness towards grid voltage. The proposed framework is gen-
eral enough to accommodate size and elasticity of different types of consumers. So, other
categories/types of consumers (i.e. residential, commercial and industrial) can be seamlessly
integrated into the model. Since actions of such consumers will be primarily dictated by
their priorities/preferences, we use the comfort, price, and grid awareness categories to high-
light the efficiency of the proposed approach. For example, among residential consumers we
may have some who prefer to keep cost low while some may choose to pay higher cost to
maintain their comfort levels. Similarly among industrial consumers, grid stability might be
more important.
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Theorem 1. The payoff function of active consumer ui(ai, ρ) given by equation (3.3) is a
concave function of ai.
Proof. The payoff function for an active consumer is sum of following three terms: 1)
βi log(ai+Ri+1), 2) −ρai, and 3) −γi(v(i)+S(i, i)(âi−ai)−1)2. First term βi log(ai+Ri+1)
is concave function of ai for βi > 0 and ai > −Ri. Second term is an affine function of ai,
and third term −γi(v(i) + S(i, i)(âi − ai) − 1)2 is also concave function of ai. As sum of
concave functions is concave, payoff function for an active consumer shown in equation (3.3)
is concave function of ai.
The electricity price, which is decided by the aggregator is unknown to the active con-
sumers. The active consumers observe the probability distribution of uncertain electricity
price and decide their action. The active consumers decides the optimal strategy based on
the perceived payoff. Equation (3.4) represent expected payoff of an active consumer ac-
cording to the EUT, whereas equation (3.5) shows perceived payoff of an active consumer








ui(ai, ρj)ω(P(ρ = ρj)) (3.5)
Goal of the active consumers is to maximize their perceived payoff based on their subjective
probabilities, which is given by equation (3.5). Theorem 2 shows the best response action of
an active consumer.
Theorem 2. The best response action of an active consumer that maximizes its perceived
payoff is given by equation (3.6).










x = −2γiS(i, i)2, (3.7)
y = 2γiS(i, i)(v(i) + S(i, i)âi − 1)− P̂ − 2γiS(i, i)2(Ri + 1) (3.8)
z = βi − P̂ (Ri + 1) + 2γiS(i, i)(v(i) + S(i, i)âi − 1)(Ri + 1) (3.9)
Proof. The perceived payoff of an active consumer for taking action ai for given mixed




[βi log(ai +Ri + 1)− ρjai




The active consumers take an action that maximizes their perceived payoff ΠPTi . Let a
∗
i be
an optimal action of the active consumer given by:
a∗i = arg max
ai
ΠPTi , (3.11)
where a∗i is the optimal action of an active consumer that maximizes the perceived payoff.
The optimal action of an active consumer can be found by differentiating the perceived payoff







ai +Ri + 1
− ρj − 2γiS(i, i)(v(i)
+S(i, i)(âi − ai)− 1)]ω(P(ρ = ρj)) = 0,
(3.12)
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Dividing with ω(P(ρ = ρj)) we wet
βi
ai +Ri + 1
−
∑
j ρjω(P(ρ = ρj))∑
j ω(P(ρ = ρj))
− 2γiS(i, i)(v(i) + S(i, i)(âi − ai)− 1) = 0.
(3.13)
Let P̂ be the perceived price of electricity defined as:
P̂ =
∑
j ρjω(P(ρ = ρj))∑
j ω(P(ρ = ρj))
. (3.14)
Substituting equation (3.14) into equation (3.13):
βi
ai +Ri + 1
− P̂ − 2γiS(i, i)(v(i) + S(i, i)(âi − ai)− 1) = 0. (3.15)
Multiplying equation (3.15) with ai +Ri + 1 and simplifying to standard quartic form, we
get
− 2γiS(i, i)2a2i +
[
2γiS(i, i)(v(i) + S(i, i)âi − 1)− P̂




βi − P̂ (Ri + 1)
+2γiS(i, i)(v(i) + S(i, i)âi − 1)(Ri + 1)] = 0
(3.16)







where x, y and z are given by equation (3.7)(3.8) and (3.9).
Although an individual active residential consumers may not cause or solve voltage vio-
lation in the distribution system due to relatively low value of energy consumption or gen-
eration, commutative actions of multiple active consumers with distributed energy sources
could cause voltage changes in the power distribution system, which would be detrimental
to all consumers. In the envisioned transactive energy system with consumer owned dis-
tributed generation, voltage violations can be avoided by raising consumer awareness about
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grid voltage and programming grid awareness into smart home energy management systems.
Additionally, large industrial consumers with large load/generation can make a significant
impact on voltage profile and may have to pay penalties for voltage violations. In such
scenarios, the active consumers may care about the grid voltage profile. This is especially
applicable for microgrid environment, where the distribution system is more prone to voltage
fluctuations. However, in this work, violations in the distribution system voltages are not
modeled as a hard constraint, which may results in infeasible solution. Although idea of
grid aware consumers may be futuristic at this point, this work demonstrates that one way
to solve voltage violation in the future smart grid is by the active consumer participation.
Further, this work assumes that the aggregator and the active consumers can calculate the
line voltage at the point of grid connection using smart meter data. This will allow the
active consumer to know the grid voltage. Based on the voltage information and location of
the household in the grid, an active consumer can compute value of S(i, i) using an analyt-
ical method of voltage sensitivity analysis proposed in [16, 17]. Further, this work assumes
that the aggregator has some method of estimating coefficient of rationality of the active
consumers. In practice, the aggregator can observe past responses of active consumers to
change in price of electricity and the distribution system voltages to estimate coefficient of
rationality αi and other behavioral parameters such as βi and γi. This can be done using re-
gression and curve fitting algorithms. There is a plethora of techniques available in the area
of machine learning to estimates the best response strategy of the active consumers. Exact
method of estimating such parameters is outside the scope of this research. We believe that
the advances in data analytic in the smart grid domain will make this feasible in the near
future. Based on estimated best response actions of all the active consumers, the aggregator
decides the optimal probability distribution of electricity prices that maximizes the payoff.
3.4 Behavior of the Aggregator
Goal of the aggregator is to maximize the monetary profit while improving voltage profile
of the power distribution grid. The aggregator purchases A kWh of energy from day-ahead
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market at cost ρda unit/kWh. Any additional energy is purchased in the real-time market
at ρrt unit/kWh. It is assumed that the aggregator knows best response action of all active
consumers. In other words, the aggregator is assumed to know βi, γi, Ri,v,S, âi and the
coefficient of rationality for all the active consumers. The impact of lack of knowledge or
incorrect information about consumer behavior is analyzed in the results section. Let a be
a vector of the best response action of all the active consumers, â be a vector of previous
action of all the active consumers, v be a vector of the distribution grid voltage and S be
the sensitivity matrix. Payoff function of the aggregator can be written as:
ua = PTρaT1− ρdaA− θ‖v + S(â− a)− 1‖ − ρrt(aT1− A), (3.18)
where 1 is vector of all 1’s and θ is the coefficient of grid awareness for the aggregator that
indicates how much the aggregator is committed to maintaining the physical grid voltage.
Here, PTρaT1 indicates the total income of the aggregator from money charged to the active
consumers. Second term in equation (3.18), ρdaA, is the amount that the aggregator pays to
the independent system operator (ISO) for buying bulk electricity in the day-ahead market.
Last term in equation (3.18), ρrt(a
T1−A), indicates the cost of additional energy purchased
from the real-time market. Finally, ‖v+S(â−a)−1‖ is the metric that indicates deviation of
the distribution grid voltage from the rated voltage. The aggregator decides the probability
distribution of electricity prices that maximizes (3.18).
Theorem 3. For 0.11 ≤ P ≤ 0.91, payoff function of an aggregator is a concave function
of P .
Proof. Payoff function of the aggregator is given by equation (3.18). From lemma 1, it can be
proven that the optimal action of an active consumer ai is a convex decreasing function of P.
As sum of convex functions is convex, aTi 1 is also a convex function of P for 0.11 ≤ P ≤ 0.91.
The first term of equation (3.18), PTρaT1 is a concave function of P as it is product of
a linearly increasing function of P (PTρ) and a convex decreasing function of P (aT1). The
second term of equation (3.18), −ρdaA is a constant. As convex function of a convex function
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is convex, −θ‖v + S(â− a)− 1‖ is a concave function of P. From lemma 1, it can be shown
that −ρrt(aT1 − A) is a concave function of P as ρrt and A are constant. Summation of
concave functions is concave leading to Theorem 3.
The optimal mixed strategy of the aggregator corresponds to (3.19)
P∗ = arg max
P
ua, (3.19)
which can be found numerically. Based on estimated best response of the active consumers,
the aggregator decides the optimal probability distribution of electricity prices that maximize
the aggregator’s objective function, which is the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy of the
aggregator. In a highly dynamic transactive energy market, electricity prices changes in
real-time. In the proposed system model, the aggregator can determine the distribution
for price of electricity (based on estimated response) and announce mixed strategy to the
active consumers. This probability distribution for electricity price can be treated as the
preliminary handshake process that establishes equilibrium electricity prices. The aggregator
will decide and announce the actual price of electricity based on the equilibrium probability
distribution. The active consumers observe the aggregator’s mixed strategy and decide
their optimal response based on their perceived probability distribution. This leader follower
game results in a Stackelberg equilibrium where all the active consumers and the aggregator
are playing their optimal strategy. Change in the Stackelberg equilibrium with change in
consumer type and rationality and their impact on physical grid voltage is investigated in
the next section.
3.5 Simulation and Results
To investigate the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed system, we use a modified IEEE
69 bus system as shown in Fig. 3.3. A scenario is considered where four type of active
consumers exist in the distribution grid. Type-A active consumers are highly comfort-seeking
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Figure 3.3: Consumer Types and location on IEEE 69 bus test system
Table 3.1: Consumer Types
Consumer Type β γ
A - Highly comfort-seeking and grid aware 0.85 1
B - Comfort-seeking and grid aware 0.75 1
C - Comfort-seeking and grid unaware 0.75 0
D - Low comfort-seeking and grid aware 0.40 1
and consider grid voltage while making decisions. Type-B active consumers are relatively
low comfort-seeking and are also grid aware. Type-C active consumers have the same level
of comfort requirement as type-B active consumers but they do not consider physical grid
voltage while making decisions, and type-D active consumers are the least comfort-seeking
with the lowest value of β. Table 3.1 summarizes the type of active consumers and their value
of β and γ. In order to maintain fairness of weights, values of β and γ are normalized using
weight fairness model proposed in [66]. Fig. 3.3 shows location of different kind of active
consumers in the distribution grid. There are no active consumers connected to bus 1 to 3.
Note that the modeling and analysis approach is general and is applicable to other scenarios
as well. For simplicity in interpretation, renewable generation for each active consumer (Ri)










































Figure 3.4: Stackelberg equilibrium and corresponding voltage level
unit/kWh; (2) 0.5 unit/kWh, and (3)1.0 unit/kWh (ρ = {0.1, 0.5, 1.0}). For this case, the
optimal mixed strategy of the aggregator at the Stackelberg equilibrium is shown in Table
3.2. Actions of a consumer in response to the optimal mixed strategy of the aggregator
are shown in Fig. 3.4(a) and corresponding distribution grid voltage levels are shown in
Fig. 3.4(b). From Fig. 3.4(a) it can be seen that energy consumptions of type-A active
consumers are much higher compare to the other active consumers because of higher value
of βi. On the contrary, type-D active consumers which are low comfort-seeking prefer to sell
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Table 3.2: Stackelberg equilibrium strategy of the aggregator
Price of electricity (ρ) 0.1 0.5 1.0
Probability P(ρ) 0.16 0.18 0.66
some of the renewable generation back to the grid in order to make more money resulting it
negative values of ai. Voltages at bus 28 to 35 are higher than 1 p.u. because of the active
consumers injecting power into the grid. Although all type-B active consumers have same
value of β and γ, their actions are different because they adjust their energy consumption
in accordance with physical grid voltage as shown in Fig. 3.4(a). On the other side, actions
of all type-C consumers are the same as they do not consider physical grid voltage while
making their decisions. The best response action of an active consumers can be computed
using analytical expression provided by Theorem 2, which can be computed quickly. For
the aggregator, computation of the optimal mixed strategy requires estimation of the best
response strategy of all the active consumers. Although the exact computational complexity
of such estimation can vary based on the exact method used, this step has to be performed
only once and does not have to be done in real-time. Once the best response action of all
the active consumers is estimated, the optimal mixed strategy of the aggregator P∗ can be
computed numerically as unconstrained convex optimization problem. Computation time to
calculate the Stackelberg equilibrium for the IEEE 69 bus distribution system is 1.81 second.
The IEEE 69 bus distribution system is used in this work, which is adequate to demonstrate
the methodology presented in this work.
Fig. 3.5 shows change in consumer action with rationality level of the active consumer.
An active consumer is considered with β = 0.65, γ = 1, Ri = 10kWh located at node
16 of the IEEE 69 bus test system. In this scenario price of electricity can take only two
values 0.1(unit/kWh) and 0.5(unit/kWh) (ρ = {0.1, 0.5}). The curve with triangle markers
represents a case where P(ρ = 0.1) = 0.8 and P(ρ = 0.5) = 0.2, and the expected value
of price of electricity is 0.18 unit. It can be observed that the active consumers with lower
rationality are more risk averse when expected price of electricity is low. Curve with diamond
marker represent a case where P(ρ = 0.1) = 0.2 and P(ρ = 0.5) = 0.8, with the expected
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Coefficient of Rationality
























P(ρ = 0.1) = 0.2
P(ρ = 0.5) = 0.8
P(ρ = 0.1) = 0.8
P(ρ = 0.5) = 0.2
Figure 3.5: Change in active consumer action with coefficient of rationality
value of price of electricity of 0.42 unit. The active consumers with lower rationality are
more risk taking when expected price of electricity is high for lower values of α.
Fig. 3.6 shows change in the aggregator profit and number of voltage violations at the
Stackelberg equilibrium for different coefficient of rationality of the active consumers. Here,
it is assumed that all the active consumers have same coefficient of rationality and the
aggregator is assumed to know it. From Fig. 3.6(a) it can be seen that the aggregator’s
monetary profit decreases as the active consumers become more rational. This implies that
the aggregator can exploit irrational behavior of the active consumers. Grid aware the
active consumers modify their power based on voltage at the point of connection. However,
the profit of the aggregator depends on how the active consumers respond to changes in
electricity prices. Therefore, the profit of the aggregator does not change significantly based
on grid awareness of consumers. Fig. 3.6(b) shows number of voltage violations at the
Stackelberg equilibrium for different coefficient of rationality, when the active consumers
have high coefficient of grid awareness (γ = 1) and when the active consumers are grid
unaware (γ = 0). It can be seen from Fig. 3.6(b) that number of voltage violations are less





















































Figure 3.6: (a) Change in the aggregator profit at equilibrium with coefficient of rationality
(b) Corresponding number of voltage violations
violations decrease as consumers behave more rationally.
To highlight difference between the EUT and the Prospect Theory models, we consider
two different scenarios and observe action of the active consumers for each case. In case one,
the support set for price of electricity is ρ = {0.1, 0.5, 1.0} and for the second case support set
for price of electricity is ρ = {0.5, 0.7, 1.0}. In both the scenarios expected price of electricity

























Coefficent of rationality = 0.5
Price of electricity ∈ {0.1 0.5 1.0}
Price of electricity ∈ {0.5 0.7 1.0}
Consumer Index
(b)





















Coefficent of rationality = 0.9
Figure 3.7: Change in consumer behavior with change in reference price level
According to the EUT, the action of the active consumers should be the same in both cases,
which is not the case in reality. When the active consumers are not completely rational,
their actions differ in both cases as shown in Fig. 3.7. Fig. 3.7(a) and 3.7(b) show actions
of all the active consumers when coefficient of rationality for all the active consumers are set
to 0.5 and 0.9 respectively. From Fig. 3.7(a), it can be observed that actions of the active
consumers are very different for these scenarios when the active consumers are relatively less
rational (α = 0.5); however, actions of the active consumers are almost the same for both
scenarios as they are highly rational (α = 0.9) as shown in Fig. 3.7(b).
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Consumer Index





















Coefficient of rationality = 0.7
Coefficient of rationality = 0.8
Coefficient of rationality = 0.6
P(ρ = 0.1) = 0.16
P(ρ = 0.5) = 0.18
P(ρ = 1.0) = 0.66
Figure 3.8: Active consumer actions for different coefficient of rationality
The active consumers with different levels of rationality take different actions under the
same probability distribution of electricity price. A scenario is considered when there is an
error in the aggregator’s estimate of coefficient of rationality (α). The aggregator decides
the optimal mixed strategy assuming αi = 0.7 for all the active consumers. However, actual
coefficient of rationality for the active consumers is different. In this scenario, values of
β = 0.85 and γ = 1 are assumed to be known to the aggregator. Sample space for the price
of electricity is {0.1, 0.5, 1.0} and the optimal mixed strategy of the aggregator is {0.16, 0.18,
0.66} assuming α = 0.7. Fig. 3.8 shows response of the active consumers for a given mixed
strategy of the aggregator. Expected response of the active consumers by the aggregator is
represented by curve with triangle markers, which corresponds to the case where α = 0.7 for
all the active consumers. If coefficient of rationality for all the active consumers is 0.6 or 0.8,
actual response of the active consumers is represented by curve with diamond and hexagram
markers respectively. This shows that incorrect estimation of coefficient of rationality can
result in actions different from actions expected from the consumers.
Number of physical voltage violations can be reduced when the active consumers do
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Figure 3.9: Change in number of voltage violation at equilibrium with γ
consider physical voltage while taking actions. To observe change in number of voltage
violations with γ, a scenario is considered where α = 0.8 and β = 0.85 for all the consumers.
Fig. 3.9 shows change in number of voltage violation for different values of γ. As value of γ
increases number of voltage violations decrease.
3.6 Summary
This chapter develops a Prospect Theory based realistic model of the active consumers with
varied preferences for electricity consumption and different levels of rationality. The inter-
action between the active consumers and the aggregator is modeled as a Stackelberg leader-
follower game from a techno-economic perspective by including physical grid constraints in
terms of voltage violation within the analysis. The interaction between the active consumers
and the aggregator is analyzed using simulations on the IEEE 69 bus test system. Impact




Analytical Method of Voltage
Sensitivity Analysis
After developing model of active consumer in last chapter, in the next two chapters we will
develop probabilistic voltage sensitivity analysis - an analytical tool to investigate impact of
large scale penetration of active consumers on distribution system voltage. The power grid
will no longer be only a delivery mechanism for electricity after the introduction of active
consumers and increasing penetration of renewable generation. These installations will inject
current back into the grid, thereby affecting the voltage profile of the distribution network.
Analyzing the impact of large-scale penetration of active consumers on the voltage profile
will be critical for distribution grid operational planning.
Sensitivity analysis studies change in voltage at a given bus in a distribution system as
a function of change in active and reactive power at another bus in the network. Current
methods of sensitivity analysis uses numerical methods to compute sensitivity matrix. For
example, the sensitivity matrix is usually calculated by perturb and observe method or from
inverse of Jacobian matrix used in power flow calculations[67]. Such traditional methods do
not provide analytical insight on the impact of change in power consumption at one bus on
voltage at other nodes. Most of these studies are simulation based [68, 69, 70]. Random
behavior of spatially distributed multiple active consumers can cause random fluctuations in
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voltage of distribution network. Traditional method of sensitivity analysis cannot be used to
derive the probability distribution of voltage change at any given node in the network. This
work aims to help grid operators prepare for the future modernized grid by introducing an
analytical method for voltage sensitivity analysis, leading to new insights on the impact of
active consumers on grid operations.
4.1 Background: Traditional Methods of Voltage Sen-
sitivity Analysis
Consider a power distribution network with N buses. Let Pi and Qi be real and reactive
power consumption at bus i. Change in real or reactive power consumption at any bus in
the network results in change in voltage magnitude |∆Vj| and change in angle of voltage
∆θj at bus j. Sensitivity matrix is a 2N × 2N matrix indicating bus voltage sensitivity in
power distribution network due to variations of active and reactive power. Two traditional
methods of sensitivity analysis are the Newton-Raphson load flow method and the perturb-
and-observe method. The Newton-Raphson load flow algorithm is an iterative approach to
calculate network bus voltages. Conventionally, the sensitivity matrix is readily obtained
from the inverse of the standard Jacobian matrix J used in the Newton-Raphson load-flow






















where ∆θn is change in phase and
∆|Vn|
|Vn| is fractional change in voltage at bus n. It must
be noted that bus one is not included in calculation as bus one is typically considered to
be the substation set at stable voltage of 1∠0 per unit. ∆Pm and ∆Qm are the real and
reactive power injected at bus m. Once the load flow solution converges, the Jacobian matrix
specifies the sensitivities of Pm and Qm with respect to |Vn| and θn for the current state of
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The Newton-Raphson method is convenient when the Jacobian of the Newton-Raphson
load-flow algorithm is accessible, which is not the case always. Many software packages do not
allow users to access Jacobian matrix. An alternative method to perform sensitivity analysis
is the “perturb-and-observe” approach. This method relies on making small perturbation in
complex bus power consumption and measuring the impact on bus voltages of the system
[67]. This approach is less efficient because it recomputes the entire network state for any
minor changes within the network, making the method slow and computationally complex.
To summarize, existing methods of sensitivity analysis are based on iterative algorithms
with significant computational complexity. The Jacobian matrix obtained from the Newton-
Raphson method is valid only for a specific state of the system and must be recomputed
for major changes in the network state. None of the described methods allow straightfor-
ward analytical computation of voltage change at a particular bus as function of complex
power injection at another bus in the network. This hampers the investigation of scenarios
where one might encounter stochastic behavior of active consumers, power generated etc.
Current methods of sensitivity analysis uses numerical methods to compute the sensitivity
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matrix. Value of sensitivity matrix computed using such method is valid for given state of
the system, and it do not provide any analytical insight into effect of grid state on values
of sensitivity matrix. For example, sensitivity matrix computed using such method do not
provide information about effect of grid voltage on values of sensitivity matrix. Any proba-
bilistic analysis done using such method is valid for given state of the system only. In a case
where state of the distribution system is random, i.e. voltages at actor nodes is random, we
need analytical method of sensitivity analysis to derive probability distribution of voltage
change. Section 4.2 provides a computationally efficient analytical method of computing an
element-wise upper bound on the sensitivity matrix.
4.2 Analytical Method for Sensitivity Analysis
Change in power consumption at any node causes change in voltage at all nodes in a dis-
tribution system. In this dissertation, terms node and bus are used interchangeably. Nodes
that change their power consumption are referred to as actor nodes, and node where change
in voltage is examined is referred to as an observation node. This section develops an an-
alytical upper bound for voltage change at an observation node (∆Vo) due to change in
complex power at an actor node (∆Sa) in a radial distribution network. It is assumed that
the source bus acts like a slack bus. In other words, voltage at the substation is assumed
to be constant at all times irrespective of changes in network power consumption. This
work assumes a constant power model for loads in the power flow. When an actor node
(a) changes its complex power consumption from Sa to Sa + ∆Sa, voltage at observation
node changes from Vo to Vo + ∆Voa. Here ∆Voa is change in complex voltage at observation
node o due to change in complex power at actor node a. For now, let’s assume that power
consumption at all other nodes is unchanged.
Theorem 4. For a radial power distribution network, change in voltage at an observation
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of shared conductor between two nodes





where V ∗a is complex conjugate of voltage at the actor node; and Zoa is impedance of shared
line between observation node o and actor node a from the source node, as illustrated in Fig.
(4.1) with the red line.
Proof. Voltage at an observation node can be expressed in terms of difference between voltage
at source node and sum of voltage drop across all edges between observation node and source
node. Let Eo be a set of edges between source node and observation node. Using Kirchhoff’s
voltage law (KVL), voltage at node o can be written as:
Vo = Vs −
∑
e∈Eo
V de , (4.4)
where V de is voltage drop across edge e. Let Ie be current flowing though edge e and Ze be
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impedance of edge e. In LV distribution networks, value of shunt impedance in very small
and is usually ignored as standard practice [48]. According to KCL voltage at node o can
be written in terms of line current and line impedance as follows:




Let Sn be complex power consumption/injection at node n, and V
∗
n be complex conjugate of






Ne is the set of all nodes n for which edge e is between node n and source node. Power
from source node to all nodes in the set Ne flows though edge e. Therefore, change in power
consumption at nodes n ∈ Ne results in change in current flowing through edge e. Now
voltage at observation node can be written as









Ne is the set of all nodes n for which e is between node n and source node. Now if power
consumption of all nodes change from Sn to S
′
n, then voltage at all nodes will change from
Vn to V
′
n and so voltage at observation node will change to V
′
o . Changed voltage (V
′
o) at the
observation node due to changed power consumption of multiple nodes can be written as:









where S ′n = Sn + ∆Sn and V
′
n = Vn + ∆Vn are changed power consumption and changed
voltage of node n, respectively. The effective voltage change at observation node can be
written as: ∆Vo = V
′
o − Vo. From equation (4.6) and (4.7), change in observation node
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For practical purpose it is reasonable to assume that change in voltage is small compared to













n ). Voltage change at observation node represented by equation












Equation (4.9) holds for cases with more than one actors nodes. Here only one actor node is
changing its power consumption; therefore, ∆Sn is zero for all nodes except one particular
actor node a. Let Ea be a set of all edges between actor node and source node. When actor
node a changes power consumption, current flowing though edges changes for all edges that





























e∈Eo∩Ea Ze is impedance of the shared line between node o and a from the
source node. Equation (4.10) can be written in term of real and imaginary values as follows.
∆V roa = −
[
(∆PaRoa −∆QaXoa)(V ra + ∆V raa)
(V ra + ∆V
r
aa)










(V ra + ∆V
r
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where V ra and V
i
a are real and imaginary values of voltage at actor node respectively. For
positive values of ∆Pa (increase in power consumption or decrease in power injection), ∆V
r
aa
is negative. For negative values of ∆Pa (decrease in power consumption or increase in power
injection), ∆V raa is positive. In a power distribution network, voltage angle relative to source
node is usually very small making V ia and ∆V
i
a very small. Under this assumption, real part
of voltage change can be upper bounded by following equation.















Similarly, imaginary part of voltage change can be written as:
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For positive values of ∆Qa and ∆Pa (increase in power consumption or decrease in power




a is very small. For negative values of ∆Pa
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Therefore upper bound on complex voltage change can be written as follows.
− ∆Sa












Here, inequality sign for complex number indicates upper bound on real and imaginary
values. This notation is used throughout in the dissertation. From equation (4.16), it is
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observed that change in voltage at an observation node o due to change in complex power
at an actor node a depends on the change in power consumption or injection, value of
complex voltage at actor node and location of both nodes that eventually decides Zoa. After
calculating the upper bound on voltage change due to one actor node, effect of multiple actor
nodes on observation node voltage is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Superposition Law: If A is a set of actor nodes in the network, effective
change in complex voltage at the observation node o due to the cumulative effect of all actor







where A is set of all actor nodes.
Proof. Consider a generic network with multiple actor nodes a1, a2, · · · , aL, aL+1, · · · , aL+M ∈
A and a generic observation node o as shown in Fig. 4.2. In this network, all actor nodes
are ordered in a way that set Ea1 ∩ Eo has the least number of elements (edges) and sets
Eo = EaL+1 ∩ Eo to EaL+M ∩ Eo all have the same and highest number of elements (edges), as
represented mathematically in equation (4.18) and graphically in Fig. 4.2. In other words,
in a distribution network, length of shared line between actor node a1 and observation node
o from source node is smallest and length of shared line between actor nodes aL+1 to aL+M
and observation node o from source node is highest.
|Ea1 ∩ Eo| ≤ |Ea2 ∩ Eo| ≤ · · · ≤ |EaL ∩ Eo|
≤ |EaL+1 ∩ Eo| = |EaL+2 ∩ Eo| = · · · = |EaL+M ∩ Eo|,
(4.18)
since |Ea1 ∩ Eo| is the cardinality of set Ea1 ∩ Eo. Let’s divide the set Eo into L + 1 smaller
subsets as follows:




Eo ∩ (Eal − Eal−1)
(4.19)
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Figure 4.2: Example of a network with multiple actor nodes
since Eo ∩ (Eal − Eal−1) = φ for al = aL+2 or greater as Eo ∩ Eal = Eo ∩ Eal−1 . Using this we
































































Inequality sign shown in equation (4.22) shows upper bound on real and imaginary values
of voltage change. This lemma proves that the proposed analytical method represented by
equation (4.17) holds the law of superposition.
4.3 Simulation and Results
This section verifies the derived analytical bound via simulation of the IEEE 69 bus test
system. The nominal voltage of test system is 12.66 kV. As a benchmark, results from
the proposed approach are compared to results of an existing sensitivity analysis method
that uses the Newton-Raphson iterative method to compute the sensitivity matrix. IEEE
69 bus radial distribution test system shown in Fig. 4.3 is used as a test network. Fig.
4.4 shows change in voltage at bus 27 as function of change in real power consumption
at node 27. Values of ∆P27 is varied from −250 kW to +250 kW, where negative values
of ∆P27 represents decrease in power consumption or increase in injection of power into
the grid and similarly positive values of ∆P27 represents increase in power consumption or
reduction in power injection. The solid line in Fig. 4.4 shows values of ∆V27 computed
using proposed analytical method and dashed line shows values computed using existing
Newton-Raphson based iterative sensitivity analysis method. Proposed analytical method
of sensitivity analysis provides a good approximation of change in voltage near point of
operation, which can be seen in Fig. 4.4. Fig. 4.4 shows that change in voltage calculated
from proposed method is approximately equal to actual ∆V for |∆P | ≤ 125 kW, which is
very large value of change in power consumption for distribution system. Fig. 4.5 shows an
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Figure 4.3: IEEE 69 bus test system
example when power injection of node 25 is increased by 1 kW and voltage change at all
nodes are computed using the proposed approach and the newton-raphson based sensitivity
analysis. Here x-axis indicates the node number and y-axis shows magnitude of voltage
change at that node. Fig. 4.5 shows that voltage change computed via proposed method
is always higher in magnitude compared to results obtained using the existing sensitivity
analysis method, which is also supported by equation (4.3). Similarly, Fig. 4.6 shows
another example of change in network voltage when power injection of node 15 is increased
by 1 kW. These results also illustrates the tightness of the bound in (4.3). From Fig. 4.4
it can be seen that proposed upper bound is tight for smaller value of ∆Vo, especially for
|∆Vo| < 0.05 per unit. For operational planing, the quick calculation can provide upper
bound on voltage change in distribution system.
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← (Power drawn)         ∆ P
27
  (kW)       (Power injected) →























Figure 4.4: Change in node voltage Vs. Change in power consumption
4.4 Computation of Sensitivity Matrix
The analytical equation derived in theorem 1 can be used to compute the element-wise upper
bound on a sensitivity matrix. Change in voltage magnitude and angle at a particular bus






























































Results from proposed method of sensitivity analysis
Results from traditional load-flow calculations



















Sensitivity matrices calculated using traditional methods are valid only for small per-
turbations in state of the system. If system state changes significantly, a sensitivity matrix
must be recomputed, which is computationally complex. Proposed analytical method of
sensitivity analysis provides an approximation of the sensitivity matrix for a given state
of the system. However, the proposed upper-bound is still valid when state of the system
changes significantly. Furthermore, proposed method is computationally efficient than clas-
sical load-flow method. Computation time to calculate sensitivity matrix for IEEE 69 bus
distribution system using classical load-flow method is 4.52 second. However, computing
sensitivity matrix using proposed analytical method takes only 0.58 seconds.
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Node number (i) 
















Results from proposed method of sensitivity  analysis
Results from traditional load-flow calculations
Figure 4.6: Voltage change at all nodes due to 1 kW power injection at node 21 and 42
4.5 Summary
This chapter proposes an analytical method to compute an upper bound on change in network
voltage at a given node as a function of change in complex power consumption at another
node and proves that the proposed analytical result follows the law of superposition. This
method is then used to compute an upper bound for the sensitivity matrix elements in
a computationally efficient manner. Effect of multiple active consumers on voltage at an





The analytical approach to voltage sensitivity analysis developed in chapter 4 can be used
to investigate impact of random change in power drawn/injected due to multiple spatially
distributed active consumers on distribution grid voltage. Current scenario-based analysis
to examine the effect of random spatial penetration of active consumers and spatiotemporal
variation of generation across the network is not scalable due to computational intractability.
For example, investigating the effect of a rooftop photovoltaic (PV) located at a random
location in the network on voltage of a distribution system with N buses typically involves
two steps. First, a system model is developed assuming a fixed PV location, and an iterative
power flow algorithm for all random solar generation values is executed. This step that tries
to capture the temporal variation of PV generations is computationally expensive. Secondly,
the first stage simulation is repeated for all spatial distributions of PV locations to determine
worst case or average effect on voltage. Together, the computational cost of such scenario
based analysis is large and grows with the size of the distribution system. The impact of the
actions of a single active consumer on voltage at other nodes of the network can be perceived
in the context of sensitivity analysis.
The main interest of this work is in understanding the impact of higher levels of PV
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penetration. Historical data available today do not give us enough information regarding
change in voltage due to higher levels of PV penetrations. A purely data driven approach at
this stage is therefore not feasible. The proposed method of probabilistic voltage sensitivity
analysis (PVSA) can be used for planning purposes to evaluate effect of future PV penetra-
tion in distribution systems. This method can be further refined in the future as and when
relevant data becomes available.
5.1 Probabilistic Voltage Sensitivity Analysis
One application of the analytical method voltage sensitivity analysis developed in chapter
4 is to analyze the effect of multiple active consumers on the feeder voltage. Economically
inspired actions of active consumers have an impact on the physical system. Consumer
behavior is random which makes impact of these behavioral changes on feeder voltage also
random. For example, the grid operator may want to know probability of voltage change
being greater than allowable limit, P (|∆Vo| > 0.05p.u.), when there are arbitrary number
of active consumers with PVs at arbitrary known/random locations in distribution grid.
Therefore, it is important to derive the probability distribution of magnitude of voltage
change at any node in the given distribution system. This section investigates the effect
of spatially distributed active consumers on distribution system voltage. Here every active
consumer acts like an actor node. The change in complex voltage at an observation node
due to change in energy consumption of an actor node (equation 4.3) can be written in term







∆V roa = −
1
|Va|
(∆Pa(Roa cos θa −Xoa sin θa)−∆Qa(Roa sin θa +Xoa cos θa)) , (5.2)
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and
∆V ioa = −
1
|Va|
(∆Qa(Roa cos θa −Xoa sin θa) + ∆Pa(Roa sin θa +Xoa cos θa)) . (5.3)
From superposition law (Lemma 1), change in voltage at an observation node due to cumu-
lative effect of multiple spatially distributed actor nodes can be written as sum of change in











Behavior of an active consumer can be modeled as random variable. In this work, change
in real and reactive power consumption of an active consumer is modeled as zero mean
Gaussian random variable. Now let us define ∆S = [∆P1, · · · ,∆Pn,∆Q1, · · · ,∆Qn]T as
Gaussian random vector with mean µ = 0 and covariance matrix Σ. Value of covariance
matrix Σ can be estimated in practice based on a number of factors. Variance of change in
real and reactive power can be estimated based on size of home, size of connected renewable
generation and type of generation. Renewable energy sources such as PV and wind genera-
tion are random and spatially correlated. Effect of geographical proximity of such renewable
generation is captured by the off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix. Exact method
to calculate covariance matrix is out of the scope of this research. The goal of this work is
to derive the probability distribution of magnitude of change in observation node voltage.
5.2 Probability Distribution of Voltage Change due to
Known Active Consumer Location
In this section, we will look at a case where location of all the active consumers is known.
Method to compute distribution of |∆Vo|2 is shown below using following steps:
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1. Define Σ, and compute vectors Cr and Ci
Σ =








cov(p1, pn) · · · σ2pn cov(q1, pn) · · · cov(qn, pn)







cov(p1, qn) · · · cov(pn, qn) cov(q1, qn) · · · σ2qn

(5.5)
Values of variance and covariance depends on size of network and size of house connected to
a bus. For homes that do not have PVs, values of variance can be set to zero. In this work,
we assume that network topology is known. Therefore, value of complex bus voltage and
line impedance are assumed to be known. Let us define two vectors Cr and Ci as follows.
Values of Cr and Ci can be computed using following equation.
Cr =

−Ro1 cos θ1−Xo1 sin θ1|V1|
...
−Ron cos θn−Xon sin θn|Vn|
Ro1 sin θ1+Xo1 cos θ1
|V1|
...







−Ro1 sin θ1+Xo1 cos θ1|V1|
...
−Ron sin θn+Xon cos θn|Vn|
−Ro1 cos θ1−Xo1 sin θ1|V1|
...




2. Compute distribution of ∆V ro and ∆V
i
o
Real and Imaginary part of change in voltage at an observation node can be written as
weighted sum of elements of vector ∆S as depicted by equation (5.8) and (5.9). Weighted sum
of Gaussian random variables are normally distributed. Therefore, probability distribution
of ∆V ro and ∆V
i




∆V roa = C
T




∆V ioa = C
T
i ∆S ∼ N(0,CTi ΣCi) (5.9)
3. Define bi-variate normal vector ˆ∆Vo
Covariance between ∆V ro and ∆V
i




o ) = C
T
r ΣCi. Therefore,





 ∼ N (0,Σ1) (5.10)
where,
Σ1 =



















where ‖∆V̂o‖ is 2-norm of ∆V̂o.
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4. Perform decorrelation operation
Covariance matrix of ∆V̂o (Σ1) is not diagonal and can be diagonalized by eigenvalue
decomposition as:
Σ1 = QΛQ
T ⇒ Λ = diag{λ1, λ2} = QTΣ1Q,
where, Λ is diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are eigenvalues of Σ1 and i
th column of
Q is the corresponding eigenvector, such that QTQ = QQT = I. This decorrelation opera-
tion involves the transformation of ∆V̂o using Q
T, i.e., Y = QT∆V̂o. Therefore, the norm
of Y can be written as:





5. Find distribution of ‖Y‖2
As ∆̂Vo is Gaussian random vector, Y is also Gaussian random vector with co-variance
matrix Λ. ‖Y‖2 is sum of square of Gaussian random variables and have following values of
mean and variance.
mean(‖Y‖2) = λ1 + λ2, and var(‖Y‖2) = 2(λ21 + λ22)
Weighted sum of chi-square random variables can be approximated by gamma distribu-
tion [72]. Shape (k) and scale (θ) parameters of such Gamma approximation can be cal-
culated to match first two moments of ‖Y ‖2 such that kθ = E[‖Y ‖2] and kθ2 = var(‖Y ‖2).
Once distribution of ‖Y ‖2 is known, which is same as distribution of |∆Vo|2, one can find
probability of |∆Vo| > α.
P(|∆Vo| > α) = P(|∆Vo|2 > α2) =
∫ ∞
α2
f(‖Y ‖2, k, θ)d‖Y ‖2, (5.12)
where f(·) is probability density function of gamma random variable. Algorithm 1 summa-
rizes procedure to compute probability density function of |∆Vo|2.
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Algorithm 1 Derivation of probability distribution for |∆Vo|2
1: Define Σ, and compute vectors Cr and Ci
2: Compute distribution of ∆V ro and ∆V
i
o
3: Define bi-variate normal vector ˆ∆Vo
4: Perform decorrelation operation
5: Find distribution of ‖Y‖2
The result in equation (5.12) is quite useful in practice. For example, information about
probability distributions of voltage change at all nodes can be used to identify most vul-
nerable node in the distribution system for a given penetration of active consumers. This
result will have grid operators to plan the system better and find most vulnerable point
from voltage violation perspective. Proposed method of PVSA can be applied for distri-
bution system with voltage regulators and tap changing substation transformers with little
modification. Voltage regulators and substation transformers with on load tap changing can
been seen as corrective control action. Proposed approach of PVSA is a precursor to any
control actions. The step type voltage regulator takes an incoming voltage that will vary
with load conditions and maintain a constant output voltage. In this case, we can consider
down-stream distribution system connected to voltage regulator as an independent network
and perform PVSA for the smaller network. To analyze up-stream distribution system, we
can consider voltage regulator as a single node representing cumulative load of down-stream
network. Proposed analytical method of sensitivity analysis does not change due to on load
tap changing transformer. Sensitivity matrix has to be recomputed using proposed method
every time transformer changes its tap setting because change in substation voltage changes
the voltage at all the nodes in the network.
5.2.1 Verification using Simulation
In order to test the proposed probability distribution of |∆Vo|2, we use the IEEE 69 bus
single phase system shown in Fig. 4.3. The nominal voltage of test system in 12.66 kV.
In this simulation, actual distribution of |∆Vo|2 is obtained using Newton-Raphson based
sensitivity analysis method, and theoretical distribution is obtained using method proposed
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in section 5.1. A scenario is considered where all even number of nodes have an active
consumer. All active consumers change their power consumption randomly. Change in power
consumptions of active consumers can be correlated. This correlation exist because change
in power consumption depends on change in price of electricity or change in solar generation
in area. The covariance matrix Σ is user defined and the Σ used in this simulation is given
below. Values of variance may depend on size of home, and correlation coefficient may depend
on geographical proximity. For simulation setup, a banded structure of covariance matrix
is used to capture correlation between change in renewable generation between neighboring
nodes. However, the actual structure of covariance matrix depends on topology of the
network. It is important to note that proposed approach is quite general and can be applied
to other covariance structures as well. In this simulation change in real and reactive power
consumption is modeled as a Gaussian random variable. For nodes with active consumers,
variance of change in real power (∆P ) is set to 10 kW and variance of change in reactive
power ∆Q is set to 2 kvar. For nodes that does not represent an active consumer, variance
of ∆P and ∆Q is set to zero. In covariance matrix, off diagonal elements represents
covariance between random variables, which is given by following expression. Cov(x, y) =
ρxy
√
var(x)var(y) , where ρxy is correlation coefficient. Correlation co-efficient between
∆P ’s for different actor nodes (ρ(Pi, Pj), where i, j are only even numbers) is set to 0.2.
Correlation coefficient between ∆P and ∆Q is set as −0.1. For example, covariance between
∆P2 and ∆P4 cov(p2, p4) = 0.2
√
10 ∗ 10. For simplicity of demonstration, all PVs are set to
have same variance; however, depending upon size and location of PVs, values of variance
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To obtain actual distribution of |∆Vo|2, power consumptions of all nodes with active
consumers are changed randomly and change in voltage at a particular node is calculated
using Newton-Raphson based sensitivity analysis method. This is repeated 100, 000 times.
Scaled histogram of |∆Vo|2 is plotted as solid line in Fig. 5.3. To compute the theoretical
distribution, value of vectors Cr and Ci is calculated from actual values from network. Σ1
can be calculated based on Σ,Cr and Ci using equation (5.11), which is eventually used to












We can calculate mean and variance of ‖Y ‖2 as: E[‖Y ‖2] = 8.93, and var(‖Y ‖2) = 140.09.
This information is used to find shape and scale parameter of gamma distribution. ‖Y ‖2 ∼
Γ(k, θ), where k = 0.57 and θ = 15.69. Fig. 5.3, shows actual probability distribution of
|∆V27|2 and theoretical PDF of Gamma random variable with shape and scale parameters
approximated using shown method. It can be seen that proposed approximated distribution
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Figure 5.1: Probability Distribution of |∆V27|2
is very close to the actual distribution demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed PVSA.
To test robustness of the proposed PVSA, a scenario is considered where physical pa-
rameters of the network are uncertain. For example, line impedance of distribution system
changes with temperature. To test the impact of this temperature dependent uncertainty
of line impedance on grid voltage, a scenario is considered where the line impedances are
modeled as correlated Gaussian random variables with mean value provided by IEEE 69-bus
test system and variance equal to 20% of average line impedance. The correlation coefficient
which captures temperature dependent correlation of line impedance is set to 0.5. Fig 5.2
shows probability distribution of |∆V |2 for this scenario. From this figure, it can be seen
that proposed PVSA is robust to temperature induced uncertainty in line impedances as
PDF for this case is very close to the theoretical PDF obtained by proposed method.
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 with Uncertain Line Impedance
Theoritical PDF
Actual PDF
Figure 5.2: PDF of |∆V27|2 with uncertainty in line impedance
5.3 Probability Distribution of Voltage Change due to
Random Spatial Distribution of Active Consumers
Another application of the proposed analytical method of sensitivity analysis is to analyze
the effect of random spatial distribution of multiple active consumers on the feeder voltages.
Line voltage of network is always kept within permissible limits; therefore, it is reasonable
to assume Va ≈ 1∠0◦. Based on this assumption equation (5.2) and (5.3) can be rewritten
as:
∆V roa = − (∆PaRoa −∆QaXoa) , (5.16)
∆V ioa = − (∆QaRoa + ∆PaXoa) . (5.17)
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To represent random behavior of an active consumer change in real and reactive power
of an active consumer is modeled as zero mean Gaussian random variable. Therefore, vector














Here, off diagonal elements of the covariance matrix represent correlation between real and
reactive power of an active consumer; and ρpq is correlation coefficient between ∆Pa and
∆Qa. Impedance of a shared line between a given observation node (o) and a random actor
node can be modeled as correlated random variable. For a given observation node, mean,
variance and covariance of Roa and Xoa can be estimated based on actual line impedance





sample variance of Roa and Xoa; and ρRX indicate the correlation coefficient between Roa
and Xoa. The goal of this work is to derive probability distribution of the complex voltage
change at an observation node due to random power change of active consumers located at
random nodes. Probability distribution for real and imaginary components of the voltage
change (∆V roa and ∆V
i
oa) due to random spatial distribution of multiple active consumers
can be derived using following algorithm:
Algorithm 2 Derivation of probability distribution for real and imaginary components of
the voltage change due to random spatial distribution of multiple active consumers
1: Calculate mean and variance of ∆V roa and ∆V
i
oa
2: Calculate covariance between ∆V roa and ∆V
i
oa





4: Calculate mean and variance between ∆V ro and ∆V
i
o
1. Calculate mean and variance of ∆V roa and ∆V
i
oa
Change in complex power at node a (∆Sa) and impedance of shared line between node o and
a (Zoa) are mutually independent. Therefore, real and imaginary components of the voltage
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change are zero mean random variable as shown in (5.19) and (5.20)
mean(∆V roa) = −E[∆PoaRoa] + E[∆QoaXoa] = 0, (5.19)
mean(∆V ioa) = −E[∆QoaRoa]− E[∆PoaXoa] = 0. (5.20)
In order to compute variance of real and imaginary components of the voltage change,









Now, variance of real and imaginary components of the voltage change can be written as:

























Xo) + ρpqσpσqρRXσRoσXo (5.24)
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2. Calculate covariance between ∆V roa and ∆V
i
oa
As mean of real and imaginary part of complex voltage change is zero, covariance between
∆V roa and ∆V
i







oa]− E[∆V roa]E[∆V ioa]




+ E[∆P 2oa]E[RoaXoa]− E[∆Poa∆Qoa]E[X2oa]
= (ρpqσpσq)(σ
2
Ro − σ2Xo + µ2Ro − µ2Xo)
+ (σ2p − σ2q )(ρRXσRoσXo + µRoµXo).
(5.25)
Consider a scenario where multiple active consumers are spatially distributed in the grid.










where N is the number of active consumers which is assumed to be known. Change in
complex power of various active consumers can be modeled as correlated Gaussian random
variables. For two different active consumers located at nodes a1 and a2, ρp indicates cor-
relation coefficient between ∆Pa1 and ∆Pa2. Similarly, ρq indicates correlation coefficient
between ∆Qa1 and ∆Qa2. Effect of geographical proximity of renewable generations is cap-
tured by ρp and ρq. Exact method to calculate covariance matrix is out of the scope of this
research.
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Covariance between real and imaginary component of complex voltage change caused by two







oa2)− E[∆V roa1]E[∆V roa2]
















oa2)− E[∆V ioa1]E[∆V ioa2]
= E((∆Qa1Roa1 + ∆Pa1Xoa1)(∆Qa2Roa2 + ∆Pa2Xoa2)













4. Calculate mean and variance between ∆V ro and ∆V
i
o
Mean of sum of zero mean random variables is zero. Therefore, from (5.19) and (5.20) it can
be shown that mean of ∆V ro and ∆V
i
o is zero. Variance of real and imaginary components
























From central limit theorem, ∆V ro and ∆V
i
o converge to normal distribution as number of ac-
tive consumers increases. This information about probability distributions of voltage change
at all nodes can be used to identify most vulnerable node in the distribution system for a
given penetration of active consumers. This result will help grid operators to plan the system
better and find the most vulnerable node from voltage violation perspective. The proposed
method of PVSA is verified using simulation in the next section.
5.3.1 Verification Using Simulation
In order to test the proposed probability distribution of real and imaginary part of the
voltage change, the IEEE 69 bus balanced system is used as shown in Fig. 4.3. The nominal
voltage of the test system is 12.66 kV. In this simulation, the actual distribution of real and
imaginary part of the voltage change is obtained using Newton-Raphson based sensitivity
analysis method, and the theoretical distribution is obtained using the proposed method of
PVSA. A scenario is considered where 15 active consumers are located at random location
in the distribution system. All active consumers change their power randomly. Changes in
complex power of active consumers can be correlated. This correlation exist because change
in power depends on change in price of electricity or change in solar generation in the area.
Values of the correlation coefficients ρp, ρq and ρpq are user defined and are set to 0.2, 0.2,
and −0.1, respectively. Values of change in real and reactive power variance may depend on
the size of the home; and value of the correlation coefficient may depend on the geographical
proximity of PVs. In this simulation, change in real and reactive power is modeled as
Gaussian random variable. For nodes with active consumers, the variance of change in real
power (∆P ) is set to 10 kW and the variance of change in reactive power ∆Q is set to 2
kvar. Fig. 5.3 shows actual probability distribution of real and imaginary components of the
voltage change at node 27 and theoretical PDF of the Gaussian random variable with mean
and variance approximated using the proposed method. Mean and variance of resistance
between a random actor node and node 27 is 19.48 and 756.08 2; and mean and variance of
reactance between a random actor node and node 27 is 7.82 and 93.17 2, which is calculated
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Figure 5.3: PDF of ∆V r27 and ∆V
i
27
from data of the IEEE 69 bus test system. Value of correlation coefficient between resistance
and reactance is 0.99. However, depending upon size and location of active consumers, these
values can be different for different nodes.
To obtain actual distribution of ∆V r27 and ∆V
i
27, powers of all nodes with active con-
sumers are changed randomly and change in voltage at a particular node is calculated using
Newton-Raphson based sensitivity analysis method. This is repeated 100, 000 times. Scaled
histogram of ∆V r27 and ∆V
i
27 is plotted as solid line in Fig. 5.3. A theoretical distribution
of real and imaginary value of the voltage change is presented by dashed line in Fig. 5.3.
It can be seen that distribution calculated using the proposed method is very close to the
actual distribution, which demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed PVSA.
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5.4 Summary
In this chapter, an analytical method to compute an upper bound on change in network
voltage at a given node as function of change in complex powers of other nodes to study
effect of multiple active consumers on voltage at an observation node is introduced. Real
and imaginary part of voltage change due to random behavior of multiple active consumers
with spatially random distribution can be approximated by the normal distribution. This
method can be used for planing of distribution system to compute probability of voltage
limit violation at a given node on the network.
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Chapter 6
Dominant Influencer of Voltage
Fluctuations
This chapter uses analytical method of voltage sensitivity analysis developed in chapter 4
to identify the dominant influencer of voltage fluctuations in a analytical and computation-
ally efficient manner. Due increasing penetration of residential renewable generation in the
power distribution system, power drawn/injected by active consumers is random and causes
random fluctuations in distribution system voltage. These voltage fluctuations might cause
voltage violations at multiple nodes in the power distribution system. Therefore, a control
mechanism is needed to maintain the distribution system voltage within permissible limits.
There are multiple ways of designing voltage control mechanism (i.e., (1) Using real-time
electricity prices as an incentive to change consumer actions, or (2) installing voltage regu-
lators or capacitor at optimal locations in the power distribution system). Implementation




The dominant influencer source of voltage fluctuations at an observation node is the largest
contributor of voltage fluctuations at the observation node. An actor node can be dominant
influencer of voltage fluctuation at an observation node due to: 1) location of the actor node
in the distribution system and 2) size of the renewable generation connected at the actor
node which impacts the variance of random change in power drawn/injected by that node.
Goal of this work is to identify the dominant influencer of voltage fluctuation in a com-
putationally efficient manner. Currently, simulation based scenario analysis is the primary
planning tool to identify the dominant influencer of voltage fluctuations. In order to identify
the dominant influencer source of voltage fluctuations one must take following steps:
1. Compute variance of voltage change at the observation node due to all actor nodes: To
compute variance of voltage change at the observation node using current simulation
based scenario analysis, one must run hundreds of thousands of scenarios of Newton-
Raphson based load flow algorithm to capture temporal variation in the renewable
generations, which is computationally cumbersome.
2. Calculate reduction in variance of voltage change at the observation node for each actor
node by setting power drawn/injected by that actor node as constant: This can be done
by setting variance of change in power drawn/injected by the actor nodes as zero.
3. Actor node that results in highest reduction in variance of voltage change at the ob-
servation node is the dominant influencer sources of the voltage fluctuations at the
observation node.
Computational complexity of such simulation based scenario analysis increases significantly
with size of the network. This chapter investigates various information theoretic matrices
to identify the dominant influencer sources of the voltage fluctuations in a computationally
efficient manner, which can be used in real-time applications.
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6.2 Differential Entropy Indicator
Differential entropy of a continuous random variable is a measure of the uncertainty of the
random variable. Differential entropy of voltage change at the observation node due to
change in power at an actor node is an excellent indicator of dominant influencer of voltage
fluctuations. This section uses analytical method of voltage sensitivity analysis proposed in
chapter 4 to compute differential entropy of voltage change at the observation node due to
change in power at the actor nodes.
Proposition 1. Actor node that maximizes the differential entropy of voltage change at the
observation node (H(∆Voa)) is the dominant influencer source of voltage fluctuation (DIH).
DIH = arg max
a
H(∆Voa), (6.1)
where ∆Voa is change in complex voltage at an observation node (o) due to change in complex
power at an actor node (a).
This section presents an analytical method of identifying the dominant influencer source
of voltage fluctuation based on differential entropy. Let ∆Sa be change in complex power at
the actor node (a). According to theorem 4, change in complex voltage at an observation





where V ∗a is complex conjugate of voltage at the actor node; and Zoa is impedance of shared
line between observation node o and actor node a from the source node, as illustrated in Fig.
(4.1) with the red line. Change in voltage at an observation node due to change in power at








∆V roa = −
1
|Va|
(∆Pa(Roa cos θa −Xoa sin θa)−∆Qa(Roa sin θa +Xoa cos θa)) (6.4)
and
∆V ioa = −
1
|Va|
(∆Qa(Roa cos θa −Xoa sin θa) + ∆Pa(Roa sin θa +Xoa cos θa)) (6.5)
Here Roa and Xoa are resistance and reactance of shared line between observation node o
and actor node a from the source node. |Va| and ∆Qa are magnitude and angle of complex
voltage at the actor node. Real and imaginary part of voltage change at an observation node
due to change in power at an actor node can be rewritten as:
∆V roa = Coa∆Pa −Doa∆Qa (6.6)
∆V ioa = Doa∆Pa + Coa∆Qa (6.7)
where
Coa = −




Roa cos θa −Xoa sin θa
|Va|
(6.9)
Here, Coa and Doa are constants and depends on distribution system voltage and location
of actor and observation node. Change in real and reactive power at an actor node can be














Real and imaginary part of the voltage change at an observation node due to change in power
at an actor node are weighted sum of correlated Gaussian random variables as shown in
equation (6.6) and (6.7). Weighted sum of correlated Gaussian random variables is normally
distributed. Therefore, real and imaginary part of voltage change at an observation node
due to change in power at an actor node can be written as Gaussian random vector as shown




 ∼ N (0,Σ∆Voa) (6.12)
where,
Σ∆Voa =














oa − 2CoaDoacov(∆Pa,∆Qa), (6.14)

















= E[(∆PaCoa −∆QaDoa)(∆QaCoa + ∆PaDoa)]
= cov(∆Pa,∆Qa)(C
2




Differential entropy of voltage change at an observation node due to change in complex power
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Differential entropy of voltage change can be used to find the dominant influencer source of
voltage fluctuations.
6.3 Joint Differential Entropy Indicator
Joint differential entropy (H(∆Vo,∆Voa)) between change in complex voltage at the obser-
vation node due change in power at an actor node a (∆Voa) and change in complex voltage
at the observation node due to change in power at all actors nodes in the power distribution
system (∆Vo) is another potential indicator of dominant influencer of voltage fluctuations.
Analytical method of voltage sensitivity analysis proposed in chapter 4 can be used to com-
pute joint differential entropy of voltage change at the observation node due to change in
power at the actor nodes.
Proposition 2. Actor node that maximizes the joint differential entropy of voltage change at
the observation node (H(∆Vo,∆Voa)) is the dominant influencer source of voltage fluctuation
(DIH).
DIJH = arg max
a
H(∆Vo,∆Voa), (6.18)
where ∆Voa is change in complex voltage at an observation node (o) due to change in complex
power at an actor node (a), and ∆Vo is change in voltage at the observation node due to
cumulative actions of all active consumers.
This sections presents an analytical method of identifying the dominant influencer of
voltage fluctuations based on joint differential entropy. Let ∆S be a vector of change in real
and reactive power changes at all nodes in the power distribution system defined by equation
(6.19). ∆S can be modeled as zero mean Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix
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cov(∆PN ,∆P1) · · · σ2∆PN cov(∆PN ,∆Q1) · · · cov(∆PN ,∆QN)







cov(∆QN ,∆P1) · · · cov(∆QN ,∆PN) cov(∆QN ,∆Q1) · · · σ2∆QN

(6.20)
According to lemma 1, change in voltage at an observation node (o) due to change in
power at multiple actor nodes can be upper bounded by equation (6.21) and written in terms











Real and imaginary part of voltage change at the observation node can be written as weighted
sum of Gaussian random variables and are normally distributed as shown in equation (6.22-
6.23).
∆V ro = C
r
o
T∆S ∼ N (0,CrTo ΣCro) (6.22)


















−Ro1 cos θ1−Xo1 sin θ1|V1|
...
−RoN cos θN−XoN sin θN|VN |
Ro1 sin θ1+Xo1 cos θ1
|V1|
...
















−Ro1 sin θ1+Xo1 cos θ1|V1|
...
−RoN sin θN+XoN cos θN|VN |
−Ro1 cos θ1−Xo1 sin θ1|V1|
...
−RoN cos θN−XoN sin θN|VN |

. (6.25)
Let ∆Vo be vector of real and imaginary part of voltage change defined by equation (6.26).





 ∼ N (0,Σ∆Vo) . (6.26)
Σ∆Vo =










cov(V ro , V
i





In order to calculate join differential entropy between ∆Voa and ∆Vo, we can write a vector
of real and imaginary components of ∆Voa and ∆Vo as Gaussian random vector shown in
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Elements of covariance matrix (6.30) are derived in Appendix B. Joint differential entropy





Joint differential entropy of voltage change can be used to find the dominant influencer
source of voltage fluctuations.
6.4 Kullback-Leibler Distance Indicator
Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance or relative entropy is a measure of distance between two
distributions. KL divergence between two multivariate normal distributions (N0 and N1) of














KL distance between change in complex voltage at the observation node due change in power
at an actor node a (∆Voa) and change in complex voltage at the observation node due to
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change in power at all actor nodes (∆Vo) is another potential indicator of the dominant
influencer of voltage fluctuations.
Proposition 3. Actor node that minimizes the Kullback-Leibler distance between ∆Vo and
∆Voa is the dominant influencer source of voltage fluctuation (DIKL).
DIKL = arg min
a
DKL(Voa‖∆Vo), (6.33)
As ∆Vo and ∆Voa are zero mean bi-variate Gaussian random vector, KL distance between













where Σ∆Voa and Σ∆Vo are covariances of ∆Voa and ∆Vo given by equations (6.13) and
(6.27) respectively. Here, tr(·) indicates trace of the matrix.
6.5 Frechet Distance Indicator
Another potential indicator similarity between two distributions. Frechet distance between
two multivariate normal distributions (N0 and N1) with means (µ0 and µ1) and covariance
matrices (Σ0 and Σ1) is given by
d2F (N0,N1) = |µ0 − µ1|2 + tr
[





Frechet distance between ∆Voa and ∆Vo is another potential indicator of the dominant
influencer of the voltage fluctuations.
Proposition 4. Actor node that minimizes the Frechet distance between ∆Vo and ∆Voa is
the dominant influencer source of the voltage fluctuation (DIFD).




As ∆Vo and ∆Voa are zero mean bi-variate Gaussian random vector, Frechet distance between
∆Vo and ∆Voa can be computed using equation (6.37).
d2F (Voa,∆Vo) = tr
[





where Σ∆Voa and Σ∆Vo are covariances of ∆Voa and ∆Vo given by equations (6.13) and
(6.27) respectively. Here, tr(·) indicates trace of the matrix.
6.6 Mutual Information Indicator
Mutual information between two random variable is a measure of the amount of information
that one random variable contains about the other random variable. Mutual information
(I(∆Vo; ∆Voa)) between ∆Voa and ∆Vo is another potential indicator of dominant influencer
of voltage fluctuations.
Proposition 5. Actor node that maximizes the joint mutual information between ∆Vo and
∆Voa is the dominant influencer source of the voltage fluctuation (DIMI).
DIMI = arg max
a
I(∆Vo; ∆Voa), (6.38)
Mutual information between two bi-variate random vectors ∆Vo and ∆Voa can be computed
using equation (6.39).











and H(∆Vo,∆Voa) is given by equation (6.31). Validity of proposed metrics as an indicator
of the dominant influencer of the voltage fluctuation is tested using simulation in the next
section.
6.7 Simulation and Results
To order to test effectiveness of proposed metrics as an indicators of the dominant influencer
of the voltage fluctuation, the IEEE 69 bus balanced system is used as shown in Fig. 4.3.
The nominal voltage of the test system is 12.66 kV. A scenario is created where there are
active consumers with renewable generation at every even numbered nodes of the IEEE 69
bus system. Active consumers with three different sizes of rooftop PVs are considered in
this simulation. Change in real and reactive power at actor nodes is modeled as zero mean
Gaussian random vector. Mean and variance of real and reactive power change of all three




































 ,∀i ∈ {6, 12, 18, 24, · · · } (6.44)
Changes in complex power of active consumers are correlated. Values of correlation coeffi-
cients ρp, ρq, ρpq are set to 0.2, 0.2 and −0.1. This correlation exist because change in power
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is effected by environmental factors like changes in the price of electricity and changes in the
solar generation in the area.
In order to identify true dominant influencer of voltage fluctuations a Monte-Carlo simu-
lation is conducted as explained in section 6.1. First, variance of change in voltage magnitude
at node 27 due to actions of all active consumers of the IEEE 69 bus distribution system
is computed using simulation of 100, 000 scenarios. The reduction in variance of change in
voltage magnitude is computed by setting Σ∆Sa to zero for each active consumers sequen-
tially. The dominant influencer of the voltage fluctuations is the node that results in highest
reduction in variance of voltage change at node 27 when variance of real and reactive power
change at that node is set to zero.
DI = arg max
a
[
var(∆|Vo|)− var(∆|V −ao |)
]
, (6.45)
where var(∆|Vo|) is variance of change in voltage magnitude due to all actor nodes and
var(∆|V −ao |) is variance change in voltage magnitude due to all actor nodes except for the
actor node a. List of nodes and caused reduction in variance of voltage change at node 27 is
presented in Table 6.2. From Table 6.2 it can be seen that node 24 is the dominant influencer
source of voltage fluctuation at node 27. This is because of high variance of power change
and proximity of node 24 to node 27 in IEEE 69 bus test system. Computation time for
this scenario analysis is 22, 389.63 seconds. Here negative values of reduction in variance is
because of small sample size of number of Monte-Carlo simulations performed for this case.
To obtain more accurate results more number of scenarios must be simulated which will
increase computational time significantly.
To test proposition 1 and effectiveness of differential entropy as an indicator of the dom-
inant influencer of voltage fluctuations, differential entropy of complex voltage change at
node 27 due to each actor nodes H(∆V27a) is computed using equation (6.17). Table 6.3
lists differential entropy of ∆V27a for all actor nodes in order of maximum to minimum
differential entropy. From table 6.3 it can be seen that we can estimate top 11 dominant
influencer nodes of voltage fluctuations with reasonable accuracy using differential entropy as
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Table 6.1: Dominant Influencer of Voltage Fluctuation
Indicator Metric Dominant Influencer Node Computation Time (s)
Monte-Carlo based simulation 24 22389.63
Differential entropy 24 0.66
Joint differential entropy 18 0.71
KL distance 24 0.68
Frechet distance 24 0.70
a measure. Computation time of calculating the dominant influencer of voltage fluctuation
using differential entropy is 0.62 second, which is a significant improvement over Monte-Carlo
simulation based scenario analysis.
To test proposition 2 and test effectiveness of joint differential entropy as an indicator
of the dominant influencer of voltage fluctuations, joint differential entropy between ∆V27
and ∆V27a due to all active consumers is computed using equation (6.31). Table 6.4 lists
joint differential entropy for all actor nodes in order of maximum to minimum differential
entropy. From table 6.4, it can be seen that joint differential entropy can be used to estimate
the dominant influencer of the voltage fluctuations with fair accuracy. Computation time to
calculate the dominant influencer of the voltage fluctuation using joint differential entropy
is 0.71 second. Performance of the joint differential entropy as an indicator of the dominant
influencer of voltage fluctuation is inferior to differential entropy both in term of accuracy
and computation time.
Similar simulation is done to investigate effectiveness of Kullback-Leibler distance, Frechet
distance and mutual information as an indicator of the dominant influencer of voltage fluc-
tuations. Table 6.3 lists Kullback-Leibler Distance for all actor nodes in order of minimum
to maximum KL Distance. Similarly, Table 6.5 lists Frechet distance for all actor nodes in
order of minimum to maximum distance. From Tables 6.3 and 6.5, it can be seen that KL
distance and Frechet distance estimate the dominant influencer of the voltage fluctuations
with fair accuracy. However, mutual information fails to identify the dominant influencer
of voltage fluctuations. Computation time of calculating the dominant influencer of voltage
fluctuation using all theses metrics is less then one second. Table 6.1 shows the dominant
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influencer of voltage fluctuation using all the proposed metrics and their computation time.
6.8 Summary
This chapter introduces concept of the dominant influencer of voltage fluctuations and inves-
tigates various information theoretic metrics to analytically identify the dominant influencer
of voltage fluctuations at the observation node in the power distribution system. First, all
the candidate metrics are analytically derived. Then, accuracy and computational efficiency
these metrics are verified using IEEE 69 bus test system. It is shown that differential en-
tropy of voltage change at the observation node due to change in power at an actor node
is an excellent indicator of the dominant influencer of voltage fluctuation. Proposed ana-
lytical method of identifying the dominant influencer of voltage fluctuation is shown to be
computationally efficient.
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Table 6.2: Numerical Dominant Influencer of the Voltage Fluctuation




































Table 6.3: Differential Entropy and Kullback-Leibler Divergence Indicator
Rank Node H(∆Voa) nats DKL(Vo‖∆Voa)
1 24 6.8934 1.1064
2 18 6.4968 1.4478
3 22 6.3536 1.5761
4 26 6.0498 1.8543
5 16 5.9688 1.9295
6 20 5.5602 2.3158
7 14 4.8065 3.0452
8 12 4.7565 3.0941
9 66 4.1377 3.7012
10 68 3.6579 4.1711
11 10 3.5318 4.2937
12 60 2.7004 5.0730
13 54 2.7004 5.0730
14 64 2.2957 5.4096
15 58 2.2957 5.4096
16 52 2.1860 5.4921
17 62 1.6070 5.8406
18 56 1.6070 5.8406
19 8 1.4984 5.8879
20 6 1.0408 6.0284
21 2 -0.6160 6.1454
22 44 -0.6160 6.1454
23 38 -0.6160 6.1454
24 32 -0.6160 6.1454
25 46 -0.6160 6.1454
26 40 -0.6160 6.1454
27 34 -0.6160 6.1454
28 28 -0.6160 6.1454
29 42 -0.6160 6.1454
30 36 -0.6160 6.1454
31 30 -0.6160 6.1454
32 50 -0.6160 6.1454
33 4 -0.6160 6.1454
34 48 -0.6160 6.1454
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Table 6.4: Joint Differential Entropy Indicator




































Table 6.5: Frechet Distance Indicator





































Security and Stability of Transactive
Energy Market-based Smart Power
Distribution System
After developing model of the active consumers and analyzing impact of their actions on
distribution grid voltage, this chapter investigates impact of the false data injection attack
on operation of the transactive energy market based power distribution system. Since future
power systems with active consumers will be more complex, there will be a continuing need
to consider cyber-physical system (CPS) perspective in the operation, control, and design of
these systems. Therefore, understanding, modeling and quantifying the security and stability
of smart power distribution system driven by transactive energy market forces is critical.
Allowing consumers to actively participate in energy transactions poses risks to the grid
itself. A number of possible factors are: 1) consumers gaming the system to gain unfair
financial advantages, 2) consumer activities that destabilize the grid and cause potential
hazardous conditions, and 3) tampering with smart metering devices and commit some type
of fraud [73]. All these threats need to be analyzed taking into account the roles of the
players and their incentives. Analyzing stability and security of transactive energy market
based power distribution system is a crucial aspect of this work. In recent years, cyber
90
security has been become a significant concern to modern power system due to the prevalent
application of information technologies. In a successful false data injection (FDI) attack, an
attacker compromises measurements from grid sensors in such a way that undetected errors
are introduced into estimates of system parameters such as electricity price, total energy
demand, and bus voltages. Evading detection by commonly employed residue-based bad
data detection tests, FDI attacks are capable of severely threatening power system security
[74]. Moreover, weaknesses in cyber security can also threaten the stability of the distribution
system voltage due to the deep integration of the physical and cyber system [75, 76].
7.1 Dynamics of Electricity Prices and Demand
Consider a model of future power distribution system with multiple active consumers with
possible renewable generation and multiple third party aggregators.Here, each aggregator is
expected to be in a contractual agreement with a subset of consumers. In this contractual
agreement, the aggregator decides real-time price of electricity and communicates it to active
consumers over a communication infrastructure. For example, AMI serves as a conduit
for bidirectional information exchange between an active consumer and their aggregator.
Active consumers receive real-time electricity prices and decide their electricity consumption
based on price of electricity at a given time. Information about electricity consumptions of
consumers is communicated back to the aggregator. This work focuses only on the interaction
between a single aggregator and active consumers that are in contractual agreement with
the aggregator of interest. That is ,the aggregator can only interact and communicate with
their contracted consumers and do not have information about energy consumption of other
active consumers.
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} denote the set of active consumers that are served by the aggre-
gator of interest; and En(t) be the energy consumed by n
th active consumer at time t. The
aggregator receives this information though AMI resulting in a vector of energy consump-
tions denoted as: E(t) = [E1(t), E2(t), · · · , En(t)]. The total energy demand D(t) for the
aggregator at time t can be computed as: D(t) = E(t)T1. Based on total demand at time t,
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Figure 7.1: System Model
the aggregator decides the price of electricity for time t+ 1 as [77]
P(t+ 1) = α0 + α1D(t). (7.1)
Here P(t) is the real-time price of electricity at time t, α0 > 0 is the base electricity price in
dollars and α1 ≥ 0 is the incremental price of electricity in $/kWh. Value of α0 and α1 are
decided by the aggregator. It is expected that the aggregator will increase/decrease price of
electricity as demand increases/decreases. Criteria for selecting a favorable value of α0 and
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α1 is discussed in section 7.2.2.
Real-time electricity prices decided by the aggregator are communicated to all the ac-
tive consumers that are in contract with the aggregator. Active consumers may alter their
electricity consumption behavior in response to changes in electricity prices. Consumers are
expected to increase their electricity consumption as electricity prices decrease and decrease
their electricity consumption as price of electricity increases. Different class of consumers
may behave differently in response to changes in electricity prices. There have been various
efforts to model electricity consumption behavior of active consumers within a transactive
energy market [15, 35]. Irrespective of exact model of consumer behavior, the total demand
of electricity (D(t)) for the aggregator at time t can be estimated as a function of electricity
prices as







where β0, β1 and β2 are coefficients of demand elasticity that can be estimated based on
historical data related to change in total demand in response to changes in electricity prices
as discussed next (in section 7.1.1).
7.1.1 Estimation of β0, β1, and β2
Let Dm denote the total demand when price of electricity is Pm. With availability of m

























Here β̂0, β̂1, and β̂2 are estimated values of coefficients of demand elasticity. Although
availability of such data may seem a bit presumptuous at present, with broader implemen-
tation of smart-grid/transactive energy market, more data is expected to be available in
the future. This will enable a more accurate estimation of coefficients of demand elasticity.
Proposed model of total demand vs electricity price is general enough and can be used to
estimate wide range of load models by selecting different values of β parameters.
7.2 Equilibrium and Stability Analysis
As seen in equation (7.1) and (7.2), demand dynamics impacts electricity pricing dynamics
and vice versa. Therefore, obvious question to ask in this interactive transactive energy
market is the following: What are the stable equilibrium electricity price and demand? The
interaction between aggregator and multiple active consumers and dynamics of the electricity
price and the demand can be modeled as discrete time non-linear autonomous (no forcing
input) control system with the electricity price or the total demand as state variables of the
system.














This non-linear autonomous system have equilibrium price of electricity and equilibrium
demand. This section compute equilibrium price and demand of the proposed system model
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and establishes conditions for stability of the equilibrium point.
7.2.1 Equilibrium and Stability of Electricity Prices:
Theorem 5. The equilibrium price of electricity (P∗) for the discrete time non-linear au-




















P − 3cP ,
∆P1 = 2b
3
P − 9bPcP + 27dP ,
(7.8)
and




Proof. From equation (7.1) and (7.2), state dynamics of the discrete time autonomous control
system can be written in terms of electricity prices as







Let f(P(t)) denote the price state dynamic function defined as:
f(P(t)) := P(t+ 1)− P(t)








Let P∗ be the equilibrium electricity price of the system. At the state of equilibrium P(t+
1) = P(t) = P∗ ⇒ f(P∗) = 0.
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− P∗ = 0 (7.12)
P∗3 − (α0 + α1β0)P∗2 − α1β1P∗ − α1β2 = 0 (7.13)
Solutions of the cubic equation (7.13) can be calculated analytically via equations (7.7)
- (7.9)
The cubic equation given in (7.13) has three solutions resulting in three equilibrium
points. Therefore its important to establish conditions for stability of the equilibrium point.
Here, the notion of BIBO (bounded input bounded output) stability is considered.
Lemma 2. The set of BIBO stable equilibrium price of electricity (BP) for the discrete time
non-linear autonomous dynamical system in (7.5) and (7.6) is given by:
BP = {P | −2 <
f(P)− f(P∗)
P − P∗
< 0 }. (7.14)
Proof. Let f ′(P∗) be the slope of f(P) at the equilibrium point. The trajectory of electricity
price diverges away from equilibrium when f ′(P∗) is greater than zero at equilibrium. The
trajectory converges towards the equilibrium point without oscillations when f ′(P∗) is less
than zero and greater than −1 at equilibrium. The trajectory converges towards the equilib-
rium point with oscillation when f ′(P∗) is less than −1 and greater than −2 at equilibrium.
The trajectory diverges away from the equilibrium point with oscillation when f ′(P∗) is less
than −2 at equilibrium. Therefore, the equilibrium point is stable if:










− 1 < 0 (7.16)
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The stable equilibrium point is BIBO stable for set of P that satisfy following conditions:
f(P)− f(P∗) > −2(P − P∗),∀P > P∗ (7.17)
f(P)− f(P∗) < −2(P − P∗),∀P < P∗ (7.18)




Therefore, the BIBO stable set of electricity prices (BP) is the set of electricity prices that
satisfy equation (7.19).
The equilibrium and stability of electricity prices depends on values of coefficients of
demand elasticity, no-load and incremental electricity prices. Although values of coefficients
of demand elasticity can be estimated based on consumer behavior, aggregator can choose
favorable values of no-load and incremental electricity prices in order to achieve desired
equilibrium price of electricity and ensuring a higher level of stability.
7.2.2 Selection of α0, and α1
In proposed system model, values of no load electricity price (α0) and incremental electric-
ity price α1 are decided by the aggregator based on economic factors, stability criteria and
engineering judgment. Steps for deciding good values of α0, α1 are given by algorithm 3 and
criteria to consider are described.
Algorithm 3 Selection of α0, and α1
1: Select the desired equilibrium price of electricity (P∗)
2: Select favorable value of f ′(P∗)
3: Calculate value of incremental electricity price α1
4: Calculate value of no-load electricity price α0
1. Select the desired equilibrium price of electricity (P∗):
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Value of equilibrium price of electricity is selected based on the total demand at a
given electricity price. Value of total demand at for given price of electricity can be
evaluated using a curve of total demand vs price of electricity obtained using historical
data. Fig. 7.2 shows an example curve of total demand vs price of electricity obtained
from active consumer behavior model introduced in [15]
2. Select the slope of price dynamics at equilibrium f ′(P∗)
Once value of equilibrium electricity price and total demand is established, value of
no load electricity price (α0) and incremental electricity price (α1) can be calculated
based on the selected value of f ′ using equation (7.20). Equilibrium price of electricity
is positive (P∗ > 0, and value of β1 > 0 and β2 > 0) as total demand decreases as price
of electricity increases. Slope of price dynamics (f ′(P∗)) at equilibrium must be less
than or equal to −1 as incremental price of electricity must be non negative (α1 ≥ 0).
From equation (7.9) it can be concluded that −2 < f ′(P∗) < −1. Value of incremental
electricity price is zero (α1 = 0) when f
′ = −1. This results in the largest set of BIBO
stable electricity price and lower oscillations in demand and pricing. From an economic
perspective higher value of α1 is desirable, which results in lower value of f
′ resulting
in smaller set of BIBO stable electricity prices and greater price/demand oscillations.
Therefore, selecting a favorable value of f ′(P∗) is a tradeoff between one that results
in a more stable system and one with higher value of incremental electricity price.
3. Calculate value of incremental electricity price α1
Based on value of f ′(P∗), incremental price of electricity can be computed as,
α1 = −




4. Calculate value of no-load electricity price α0
Based on value of α0, α1 and P∗, value of no load electricity price α0 can be calculated
as follows:






7.2.3 Equilibrium and Stability of Total Demand
Theorem 6. The equilibrium demand of electricity (D∗) for the discrete time non-linear





























bD = −(α21β0 − 2α0α1),
cD = −(2α0α1β0 + α1β1 − α20),
dD = −(α20β0 + α0β1 + β2).
(7.24)
Proof. From equations (7.1) and (7.2), state dynamics of the discrete time autonomous
control system can be written in terms of electricity demand as
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Let g(D(t)) be demand dynamic function defined as:







LetD(t)∗ be the equilibrium demand of the system. At the equilibrium demandD(t+1) =







−D∗ = 0 (7.27)
β0(α0 + α1D∗)2 + β1(α0 + α1D∗) + β2 −D∗(α0 + α1D∗)2 = 0 (7.28)
α21D∗3 − (α21β0 − 2α0α1)D∗2 − (2α0α1β0 + α1β1 − α20)D∗
− (α20β0 + α0β1 + β2) = 0
(7.29)
Solutions of the cubic equation (7.29) can be calculated analytically using equations (7.22)
- (7.24)
The cubic equation in (7.29) has three solutions resulting in three equilibrium points.
Therefore its important to establish conditions for stability of the equilibrium point. Once
again, the notion of BIBO stability is invoked.
Lemma 3. The set of BIBO stable equilibrium demand of electricity (BD) for the discrete
time non-linear autonomous dynamical system in (7.5) and (7.6) is given by:
BD = {D | −2 <
g(D)− g(D∗)
D −D∗
< 0 } (7.30)
Proof. Let g′(D∗) be the slope of g(D) at the equilibrium point. The trajectory of electricity
demand diverges away from equilibrium when g′(D∗) is greater than zero at equilibrium.
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The trajectory converges towards the equilibrium point without oscillation when g′(D∗)
is less than zero and greater than −1 at equilibrium. The trajectory converges towards
the equilibrium point with oscillation when g′(D∗) is less than −1 and greater than −2 at
equilibrium. The trajectory diverges away from the equilibrium point with oscillation when
g′(D∗) is less than −2 at equilibrium. Therefore, the equilibrium point is stable if:











− 1 < −1 (7.32)
The stable equilibrium point is BIBO stable for set of D that satisfy following condition:
g(D)− g(D∗) > −2(D −D∗),∀D > D∗ (7.33)
g(D)− g(D∗) < −2(D −D∗),∀D < D∗ (7.34)




Therefore, BIBO stable set of total demand is the set D that satisfies equation (7.35).
After analyzing the equilibrium and stability conditions for given discrete time non-linear
autonomous control system, impact of FDI attacks on distribution system can be analyzed.
7.3 Impact of Cyber Attack
Any smart power distribution system with smart meters and communication infrastructure is
prone to cyber attacks. An attacker can manipulate electricity prices communicated over the
cyber infrastructure or compromise a subset of smart meters altering their measurements.
Such cyber attacks may have impacts on electricity prices, energy consumption of active
consumers and distribution system voltage. Additionally, impact of such attack can last
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for multiple time periods even when the system is attacked during only one time period.
In case of an attack on electricity demand information, the attacker can manipulate energy
consumption measurements of multiple active consumers that results in incorrect calculation
of total demand resulting in change in electricity prices in future time periods. In case of
an attack on electricity pricing, the attacker can manipulate price of electricity at any given
time. In response to the change in price of electricity active consumers may adjust their
energy consumption resulting in a change in electricity demand, which eventually may result
in changed price of electricity in future time periods. Due to mutual coupling between
electricity price and demand, a cyber attack on electricity price information impacts the
total demand and vice versa. Let D̂(t) denote the manipulated demand of electricity at time
t, and εD(t) = D̂(t)−D(t) be the error in total demand at time t. Similarly, let P̂(t) denote
the manipulated electricity price at time t, and εP(t) = P̂(t)−P(t) be the error in electricity
price at time t. Change in demand at time t (D̂(t)) results in change in price of electricity
at time t+ 1 as illustrated by the relationship,
P̂(t+ 1) = α0 + α1D̂(t). (7.36)
Similarly, change in the electricity price at time t (P̂(t)) results in change in the demand at
time t as







Error in electricity price at time t + 1 can be written in terms of error in total demand at
time t as:
εP(t+ 1) = α0 + α1(D(t) + εD(t))− α0 + α1D(t) (7.38)
εP(t+ 1) = α1εD(t) (7.39)
Similarly error in total demand at time t can be written in terms of error in electricity price









Equation (7.39) and (7.40) are error propagation dynamics of the system. Equation (7.39)
indicates that lower value of α1 results in lower propagation of the error to future time
periods. When there is error introduced in price or demand, system will asymptotically
come back to the stable equilibrium point. However, before coming to stable state system
will oscillate around the the stable state, the which causes oscillations in price of electricity,
demand and network voltage. The higher the magnitude of the error, higher the impact.
However, when introduced error is large enough to push the state out of BIBO stable region
the the system will suffer higher degree of damage.
7.4 Simulation and Results
The dynamics, stability and impact of cyber attacks on proposed transactive energy market
based power distribution system is analyzed using simulations on the modified IEEE 69 bus
balanced test system as shown in Fig. 4.3. The nominal voltage of the test system is 12.66
kV. In this simulation setup one active consumer is assumed to be located at each node of the
IEEE 69 bus test system. Model of active consumers proposed in [15] is used to mimic energy
consumption behavior of active consumers. For simplicity of demonstration, a scenario is
considered where all the active consumers in the distribution system are in contractual
agreement with a single aggregator. Additionally, all active consumers are assumed to be
identical with coefficient of comfort 0.65 and 10 kWh of renewable generation [15]. Active
consumers do not consider distribution grid voltage while making their energy consumption
decision. However, the proposed system model is valid for more general case where multiple
aggregators operate within a single distribution system with active consumers that have
varying preferences for electricity consumption.
Values of coefficients of demand elasticity (β0, β1, β2) are estimated using curve of total
demand vs normalized electricity pricing obtained using model of active consumer behavior
proposed in [15] and shown in Fig. 7.2. In order to obtain the curve of total demand vs
normalized electricity pricing, price of electricity is varied from 0.1 to 1.0 normalized cost unit
(ncu) and energy consumption of all active consumers is observed. Total demand for given
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Price of Electricity



















Figure 7.2: Change in total demand with respect to price of electricity
price of electricity is sum of individual energy consumption of all active consumers. From
Fig. 7.2, it can be seen that as price of electricity increases, total demand decreases. For
extremely high values of electricity price, the total demand becomes negative as consumers
start selling their renewable generation back to the grid. To estimate the coefficients of
demand elasticity, 10 sample data points of demand curve are used as shown by black stars
in Fig. 7.2. Values of demand elasticity β0, β1, and β2 are obtained using least square method
illustrated in section 7.1.1. Computed values are: β0 = −759kWh, β1 = 690ncu kWh and
β2 = 3.37 × 10−14ncu2kWh. Estimated curve of the total demand vs normalized price of
electricity is shown by red dashed line in Fig. 7.2. Although, this work uses model of active
consumer behavior proposed in [15] to obtain curve of total demand vs price of electricity
as more data become available values of coefficients of demand elasticity can be estimated
using actual historical data. Regardless of the data source, proposed system model is general
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BIBO Stable set of Electricity Prices
Figure 7.3: Price and Demand Dynamic function
enough to accommodate various types of active consumer models.
After obtaining values of coefficients of demand elasticity, no-load and incremental price
of electricity is calculated using algorithm 3. The equilibrium price of electricity is chosen as
0.6 ncu, which results in equilibrium demand of 391 kWh. Slope of price dynamic function
at point of equilibrium (f ′(P∗)) is chosen as −1.3. Based on P∗ = 0.6 and f ′(P∗) = −1.3,
calculated values of no-load and incremental price of electricity using algorithm 3 are α0 =
0.54 ncu and α1 = 1.56 × 10−4 ncu/kWh. Based on these values of coefficients of demand
elasticity and coefficients of electricity prices, Fig. 7.3(a) shows the plot of price dynamics
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Time (t) →






















f ′(P∗) = −1.1
f ′(P∗) = −1.4
f ′(P∗) = −1.7
Figure 7.4: Impact of cyber attack on electricity price for different values of f ′(P∗)
and Fig. 7.3(b) shows the plot of demand dynamics using a solid blue line. Red dashed line
in both figures are lines of slope −2 passing through point of equilibrium. From Fig. 7.3(a)
it can be seen that the set of BIBO stable electricity prices (BP) is [0.18, 1.0]. In case of a
cyber attack, when error introduced in price of electricity at time t (εP(t)) is large enough
to create a scenario where P 6∈ BP , error in price of electricity at time t + 1 will be higher
than error in price of electricity at time t (εP(t+ 1) > εP(t)).
Lower f ′(P∗) results in higher value of α1, which makes price of electricity more respon-
sive to changes in total load. However, higher f ′(P∗) also results in higher fluctuations in
electricity prices, demand and voltage in case of cyber attack. Fig. 7.4 shows fluctuations
in normalized price of electricity when price of electricity is reduced by 10% at time period
t = 4 for three different values of f ′(P∗). It shows that when the value of f ′(P∗) is low,
oscillations in price of electricity have higher magnitude and they last longer compared to
the case when f ′(P∗) is higher. These oscillations in price of electricity results in oscilla-
tions in energy consumption of active consumers, which results in oscillations in distribution
system voltage. Fig. 7.5 shows voltage at node 20 of the IEEE 69 bus test system. It can
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f ′(P∗) = −1.1
f ′(P∗) = −1.4
f ′(P∗) = −1.7
Figure 7.5: Impact of cyber attack on voltage at node 20 for different values of f ′(P∗)
be seen that magnitude of voltage fluctuation is highest for the lowest value of f ′(P∗), and
magnitude of voltage fluctuation is low for higher f ′(P∗) (i.e. -1.1).
Choice of f ′(P∗) also impacts number of violations in the distribution system voltage.
Fig. 7.6 shows number of voltage violation over time for different values of f ′(P∗) when
electricity price is externally reduced by 10%. From Fig. 7.6 it can be seen that number of
voltage violations increase as f ′(P∗) decreases. Number of voltage violations are minimum
when f ′(P∗) = 1. When f ′(P∗) = 1 value of α1 = 0; therefore, error introduced in electricity
price does not result in oscillations of electricity prices, demand and voltage in future time
periods. All voltage violations observed in this case occurs in the same time period as
error in the electricity price is introduced. Lower values of f ′(P∗) creates oscillations in
electricity price, demand and voltage in case of cyber attack. For lower values of f ′(P∗),
number of violations are higher due to sustained oscillations in electricity prices that results
in sustained oscillations in total demand causing higher number of voltage violation. All
additional voltage violations in these cases occur in future time periods.
To analyze impact of cyber attacks on distribution system voltage, a scenario is considered
where errors of different values is introduced in electricity pricing signal and total number of
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Figure 7.6: Number of voltage violation vs slope of price dynamic function
voltage violations in the network are observed. Fig. 7.7 shows number of voltage violations
over time due vs error introduced in electricity pricing (εP(t)). Here, negative values of
error indicates that price of electricity is artificially reduced resulting in increased power
drawn by active consumers that eventually results in higher number of voltage violations.
Positive values of error indicates that the electricity price is artificially increased resulting
in reduced energy consumption. Positive values of εP(t) do not result in large number of
voltage violations as power injection capacity of active consumers is limited by the amount
of available renewable generation. However, positive error results in oscillations in electricity
prices resulting in reduced price of electricity in the next time period which leads to higher
power drawn by active consumers and higher number of voltage violations.
A false data injection (FDI) attack on a transactive energy market (TEM) based smart
power distribution system can be engineered by manipulating electricity price or hacking
a subset of smart meters and manipulating energy consumption information of active con-
sumers. Fig. 7.8(a) shows impact of cyber attack on electricity prices, and Fig. 7.8(b) shows
impact of cyber attack on total demand. In Fig. 7.8, red dotted curve with triangle marker
108
Introduced error in Electricity Price























Figure 7.7: Number of voltage violation over time with error in electricity pricing
represents a case where demand of electricity is reduced by 20% at time t = 3, and blue
solid curve represents a case where price of electricity is decreased by 20% at time t = 4.
From Fig. 7.8, it can be seen that attack on price of electricity can cause more fluctuation
in demand and prices that can result in higher voltage violations. In order to engineer FDI
attack on total demand with significant impact on the grid, one may have to hack a large
number of smart meters and introduce error in smart meter data in a coordinated manner,
which could be challenging. Such carefully design FDI attack on demand will have lower
impact on the system compare to an attack on electricity prices which requires manipulation
of only one parameter. This indicates that security and integrity of electricity pricing signal
is much more critical.
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Figure 7.8: Dynamics of price and demand due to error in electricity price and demand
7.5 Summary
This paper builds on a discrete time non-linear autonomous control system model to capture
the iteration and dynamics of electricity prices and total demand in a transactive energy
market based power distribution system. The conditions for equilibrium and stability of
electricity price and demand are derived and used to develop an algorithm to design a stable
real-time electricity pricing scheme. Impact of false data injection attack on this transactive
energy based power distribution system is studied, and dynamics of electricity price, demand
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and distribution system voltage is analyzed using simulations on the IEEE 69 bus test system.
This work shows that an FDI attack on electricity price can have a much more severe impact
on the power distribution system compared to an FDI attack on demand. Therefore, more
resources should be spend for developing new security mechanisms to protect electricity
pricing signal from a cyber-attack.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
This concluding chapter summarizes the contributions of this dissertation and discusses
future research directions.
8.1 Conclusions
This dissertation addresses the fundamental questions in areas of (1) active consumer model-
ing, (2) analyzing impact of renewable generation on distribution system, and (3) impact of
cyber attack on the power distribution system in order to enable transactive energy market.
Firstly, this dissertation develops a Prospect Theory based model of the active consumer
behavior in response to changes in the real-time price of electricity with varied preferences for
electricity consumption and different levels of rationality. The interaction between the ag-
gregator and the active consumers is modeled as a Stackelberg leader-follower game. Unlike
previous efforts this dissertation considers this interaction from a techno-economic perspec-
tive by including physical grid constraints in terms of voltage violation within the analysis.
This work analyzes the impact of consumer actions and irrationality on distribution system
voltage and the aggregator profit using simulation of IEEE 69 bus test system.
After developing model of consumer behavior, this dissertation develops analytical tools
for grid analysis. First, an analytical method of voltage sensitivity analysis is developed
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that provides an upper bound on change in the distribution system voltage at a given bus
as a function of change in complex power at another bus due to actions of multiple active
consumers. This method can be used to compute an upper bound on the voltage sensitivity
matrix elements in a computationally efficient manner. Then, this analytical method of
voltage sensitivity analysis is used to develop the probabilistic voltage sensitivity analysis
(PVSA) for known and random spatial distribution of active consumers. Change in voltage
magnitude due to multiple active consumers located at known places in the network changing
their power randomly can be approximated by Gamma distribution. Additionally, real and
imaginary part of voltage change due to random behavior of multiple active consumers
with spatially random distribution can be approximated by the normal distribution. This
method can be extremely valuable for distribution system operators and planning as it
helps to compute the probability of voltage limit violation at a given node on the network
with random penetration of active consumers. Next, proposed analytical method of voltage
sensitivity analysis is used to investigate various infromation theoretic metrics to identify
the dominant influencer of voltage fluctuations. This work shows that differential entropy,
Kullback-Leibler Distance and Frechet Distance are excellent indicators of the dominant
influencer of the voltage fluctuations. Validity and effectiveness of proposed metrics to
identify the dominant influencer of the voltage fluctuations is shown to be computationally
efficient. All the theoretical results have been validated via simulation on IEEE 69 bus test
systems.
Finally, this dissertation models this transactive energy market based power distribution
system as a discrete time non-linear autonomous dynamical system and capture the iteration
and dynamics of electricity prices and total demand. The equilibrium and stability conditions
of electricity price and demand for this system are derived and used to develop an algorithm
to design a stable real-time electricity pricing scheme. Impact of the false data injection
attack on the transactive energy market based power distribution system is studied, and
dynamics of electricity price, demand and distribution system voltage is analyzed using
simulations on the IEEE 69 bus test system. Results show that the false data injection
attack on electricity price can have a much more severe impact on the power distribution
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system compared to the false data injection attack attack on demand. Therefore, more
resources should be spend for developing new security mechanisms to protect electricity
pricing signal from a cyber-attack.
8.2 Future Work
This section present possible future directions in areas of consumer modeling, analyzing im-
pact of renewable generation and cyber attacks on the power distribution system. Extensions
to the work presented in this dissertation are following:
• The prospect theory based model of active consumer behavior developed in chapter
3 assumes that changes in the real-time price of electricity at a given time does not
affect future actions of the active consumers. However, this model does not capture
impact of flexible and delayed loads (i.e., washer/dryer, electric vehicles). Developing
a time dependent model of the active consumer behavior along with correlated load
scheduling can be pursued in the future.
• Chapter 4 of this dissertation develops an analytical method of voltage sensitivity
analysis for the balanced three phase power distribution system assuming constant
power model of loads. This analysis can be extended for an unbalanced three phase
power distribution system with various types of load models (i.e., constant current and
constant impedance loads).
• Chapter 5 develops the probabilistic voltage sensitivity analysis (PVSA) for known
and random spatial distribution of multiple active consumers in balanced three phase
power distribution system. This analysis can be extended to a general three phase
unbalanced distribution network with a variety of load models including hybrid loads.
• Change in the power drawn/injected by the active consumers located at a specific node
of the distribution system causes change in the line losses in the power distribution sys-
tem. Future work in this area involves development of the probabilistic loss sensitivity
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analysis (PLSA) by developing an analytical method of loss sensitivity analysis for the
unbalanced three phase power distribution system with a variety of load models.
• Proposed probabilistic sensitivity analysis of voltage and losses can be used in associa-
tion with traditional load flow algorithms to enable more practical and computationally
efficient hybrid control. Such hybrid control can be helpful in understanding the stress
points in a transactive energy market based power distribution system and developing
optimal corrective control strategies.
• The dominant influencer model of Chapter 6 can also be extended to a general three
phase unbalanced distribution system with a variety of load models. Proposed domi-
nant influencer model can be used to identify the most vulnerable nodes in the network
and create vulnerability rank database for all nodes of the power distribution system.
• Chapter 7 of this dissertation assumes that the price of electricity can take any value.
This work can be extended to analysis of security and stability of multi-tiered pricing
structure with a stochastic model of consumer.
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Lemma 4. Optimal action of an active consumer a∗i , given by equation (3.6), is convex
decreasing function of P.
Proof. Numerator of equation (3.6) is linear and decreasing function of P̂ . Denominator of
(3.6) is y−
√
y2 − 4xz, where x, y, and z are given by equation (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3). Here
y is linear and decreasing function of P̂ ; and
√
y2 − 4xz is convex and decreasing function
of P̂ , which is proved in lemma 8. As reciprocal of a positive convex function is convex




is convex and increasing function of P̂ and
product of such two functions is concave (Lemma 6).
x = −2γiS(i, i)2, (A.1)
y = 2γiS(i, i)(v(i) + S(i, i)âi − 1)− P̂ − 2γiS(i, i)2(Ri + 1) (A.2)
z = βi − P̂ (Ri + 1) + 2γiS(i, i)(v(i) + S(i, i)âi − 1)(Ri + 1) (A.3)
Lemma 5. Reciprocal of a positive convex function is convex.
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Proof. Consider function f : D → R where domain of the function is convex. Let f(x) > 0
be a positive convex function. In order to prove that reciprocal of f(x), F (x) = 1
f(x)
is
convex, let us investigate conditions under which F (x) is convex. For F (x) to be convex, by
definition of convexity:
F (λx+ (1− λ)y) ≤ λF (x) + (1− λ)F (y), (A.4)











Multiplying on right hand side,
1
f(λx+ (1− λ)y)
≤ λf(y) + (1− λ)f(x)
f(x)f(y)
. (A.6)
If f(x) is convex than f(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≤ λf(x) + (1− λ)f(y).
[λf(y) + (1− λ)f(x)][λf(x) + (1− λ)f(y)]
f(x)f(y)
≥ 1, (A.7)
which can be simplified as following.
λ(1− λ)[f 2(x) + f 2(y)]
f(x)f(y)
+ λ2 + (1− λ)2 ≥ 1 (A.8)
λ(1− λ)[f 2(x) + f 2(y)] + [λ2 + (1− λ)2 − 1]f(x)f(y) ≥ 0 (A.9)
Here, [λ2+(1−λ)2−1] = −2λ(1−λ); therefore, equation above can be rewritten as following.
[f 2(x) + f 2(y)]− 2f(x)f(y) ≥ 0, (A.10)
[f 2(x)− f 2(y)]2 ≥ 0. (A.11)
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This condition is always true. Therefore, sufficient condition for a reciprocal of a convex
function to be convex is that f(x) > 0
Lemma 6. Product of two convex functions F (x) = g(x)h(x) is concave if g(x) is non-
decreasing and h(x) is non-increasing function.
From the definition of concavity, function F (x) is concave if
λF (x) + (1− λ)F (y) ≤ F (λx+ (1− λ)y). (A.12)
Replacing F (x) = g(x)h(x) into equation (A.12), it can be rewritten as:
λg(x)h(x) + (1− λ)g(y)h(y) ≤g(λx+ (1− λ)y)
h(λx+ (1− λ)y).
(A.13)
Now h(x) and g(x) are convex; therefore,
g(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≤ λg(x) + (1− λ)g(y), (A.14)
and
h(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≤ λh(x) + (1− λ)h(y). (A.15)
Substituting equation (A.14) and (A.15) into equation (A.13),
λg(x)h(x) + (1− λ)g(y)h(y) ≤[λg(x) + (1− λ)g(y)]
[λh(x) + (1− λ)h(y)].
(A.16)
Equation (A.16) can be simplied further as following:
λ(1− λ)[g(x)h(x) + g(y)h(y)− g(x)h(y)− g(y)h(x)] ≤ 0 (A.17)
[g(x)− g(y)][h(x)− h(y)] ≤ 0 (A.18)
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Equation (A.18) shows that product of two convex functions is concave if one function is
convex and non-increasing and other is convex non-decreasing.
Lemma 7. Square of a concave function F (x) = f(x)2 is convex.
Proof. From the definition of convexity, function F (x) is convex if
λF (x) + (1− λ)F (y) ≥ F (λx+ (1− λ)y) (A.19)
Substituting F (x) = f 2(x),
λf(x)f(x) + (1− λ)f(y)f(y) ≥ f 2(λx+ (1− λ)y) (A.20)
λf(x)f(x) + (1− λ)f(y)f(y)− [λf(x) + (1− λ)f(y)]2 ≥ 0 (A.21)
λ(1− λ)f 2(x) + λ(1− λ)f 2(y)− 2λ(1− λ)f(x)f(y) ≥ 0 (A.22)
f 2(x) + f 2(y)− 2f(x)f(y) ≥ 0 (A.23)
[f(x)− f(y)] ≥ 0 (A.24)
Equation (A.24) is always true; therefore, square of a concave function is always convex.
Lemma 8. Action of an active consumer that maximizes its perceived payoff given by equa-
tion (3.6). √
y2 − 4xz, (A.25)
where, x, y, and z is given by equation (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3) is convex and increasing
function of P.
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[2γiS(i, i)(v(i) + S(i, i)âi − 1− S(i, i)(Ri + 1))]2 + P̂ 2
− 4P̂ γiS(i, i)(v(i) + S(i, i)âi − 1− S(i, i)(Ri + 1)) + 8γiS(i, i)2








































= P̂ [2− 4γiS(i, i)(v(i) + S(i, i)âi − 1 + S(i, i)(Ri + 1))] ≥ 0 (A.29)
∂2b
∂P̂ 2





b ≥ 0. From this it can be proved that
√
y2 − 4xz is convex non-decreasing
function function.
Lemma 9. θ‖v + S(â− a)− 1‖ is convex function of P
Proof. According to lemma 4, a is convex function of P. As convex function of convex







































































where σ2∆V roa , σ
2
∆V ioa
, and cov(∆V roa,∆V
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oa]− E[∆V ro ]E[∆V roa]
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o2]− E[∆V ro1]E[∆V ro2]












o2]− E[∆V io1]E[∆V io2]
= E[(∆P1Do1 + ∆Q1Co1)(∆P2Do2 + ∆Q2Co2)]
= Do1Do2E[∆P1∆P2] + Co1Co2E[∆Q1∆Q2]
+Do1Co2E[∆P1∆Q2] +Do2Co1E[∆P2∆Q1]










o2]− E[∆V ro1]E[∆V io2]
= E[(∆P1Co1 −∆Q1Do1)(∆P2Do2 + ∆Q2Co2)]
= Co1Do2E[∆P1∆P2]−Do1Co2E[∆Q1∆Q2]
+ Co1Co2E[∆P1∆Q2]−Do2Do1E[∆P2∆Q1]
= Co1Do2cov(∆P1,∆P2)−Do1Co2cov(∆Q1,∆Q2)
+ Co1Co2cov(∆P1,∆Q2)−Do2Do1cov(∆P2,∆Q1).
(B.9)
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